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Not With a Bang But a Whimper:
Broadcast License Renewal and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996

Liu LEvi
In 1969, public outrage derailed a bill providing that the Federal

Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") could not consider competing applications for broadcast licenses unless it first found
that renewal of the incumbent's license would not be in the public
interest.' Citizen groups claimed that eliminating comparative challenges

to incumbent broadcasters was "back-door racism" and reinforced the
under-representation of minorities in broadcasting.2 They decried the bill
as a "vicious ... attempt to limit the efforts of the black community
to challenge the prevailing racist practices of the vast majority of TV
stations."3 When the FCC thereupon issued a policy statement adopting

a similar reform of the comparative renewal process, it was reversed by
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Angela Campbell Tom Krattenmaker, Steve Schnably and Jon Weinberg for comments, to David Schwartz
for research assistance; to Denise Polivy for editorial help; and to "77te Hollow Men" for my
title.
1. See, eg., ERwiN G. KRASNOW Er AL, Tm PoLrncs oF BROADCAsr REGLuATIto 210-13 (3d ed.
1982) (describing the delay and ultimate withdrawal of S. 2004 as a result of public outcry,
despite early hopes of passage); In re Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving
Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 FCC 2d 424 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Citizens Communications
Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971); In re Petitions by BEST et al. for Rule Making
to Clarify Standards in All Comparative Broadcast Proceedings, 24 FCC 2d 383, 389 (1970)
(Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
2. Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Subcomna on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., ser. 91-18 602 (1969) (statement of Absalom Jordan, National
Chainman, Black Efforts for Soul in Television) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2004].
3. KRASNOW Er AL, supra note 1, at 212 (quoting Picket Lines Due, BROADCASi,, Dec. 1,
1969, at 10). See also Henry Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process In Television: Problems
and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L REV. 471, 483 (1975); Hyman H. Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"-The Aftermath of WHDH n FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HAPV. L REV. 1014,
1020 (1970); Pastore, and His Bill Get Their Lumps, BROADcAsTo, Dec. 8, 1969, at 23.
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the D.C. Circuit.
Broadcasting was still the keystone of the FCC's regulatory frame-

work at the time. The Commission's role in parceling out radio and
television licenses was seen by many public interest groups as critical
in the fight for equality of representation and diversity of views.5 Yet
other FCC observers questioned the efficacy of the FCC's role.6 The
debate over the proper license renewal process resulted in hundreds of
law review pages7 and numerous sharply-worded opinions.'
Without even a nod at all these years of controversy, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act," "new Act," or "Act")9 eliminated
the traditional comparative renewal hearing for broadcast licenses and
permitted the extension of license terms to eight years.' 0 In the shadow
4. In re Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 FCC 2d 424 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447
F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
5. See Hearings on S. 2004, supra note 2, at 498-506, 588-605. Cf. Comment, Media Reform Through Comparative License-Renewal Procedures-The Citizens Case, 57 IoWA L. REV.
912 (1972) (arguing for renewal process as possible means for broadcast industry reform).
6. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Towards Simplicity and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 6; Geller, supra note 3; Goldin, supra note 3; Rosel H.
Hyde, FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings on Broadcast Applications in Which a
New Applicant Seeks to Displace a Licensee Seeking Renewal, 1975 DUKE L.J. 253 (1975);
Louis L. Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1693
(1969); Bernard Schwartz, Comparative Television and The Chancellor'sFoot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655
(1959); L. Andrew Tollin & Robert G. Kirk, The Comparative Renewal Process: A New Approach Based on Old Law, I COMM. L. CoNsPEcrus 15 (1993); Durward J. Gehring, Note,
Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Model for FCC Comparative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 573 (1976); Media Reform, supra note 5; Mark
B. Simons, Comment, The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH,
36 U. CHm.L. REv. 854 (1969); William H. Wentz, Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368 (1970). For earlier critiques of the comparative process, see, e.g., Thomas H. Wall, Section 309 of the Communications Act-the Renewal Provision--a Need for Change, 25 ADMIN. L. REv. 407 (1973);
Edward P. Gallogly & George E. Meng, Note, Television: The Public Interest in License Renewals, 20 CATH. U. L. REV. 328 (1970).
8. For examples of criticism of FCC license renewal policies in Commission dissents and
D.C. Circuit opinions, see Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979) (criticizing FCC's "institutional forms of decision making
. . . [as] fall[ing] somehere on the distant side of arbitrary"); Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC,
515 F.2d 684, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (characterizing FCC's comparative evaluation process as
lacking rational structure); In re Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving
Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 FCC 2d 424, 432 (1970) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (citing
to cases in which he and Comm'r Cox "urge[d] the application of some standards, however
minimal, to the Commission's license renewal process"). See also Hyde, supra note 7, at 267,
277-78.
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
10. See id. §§ 203 (increasing maximum possible broadcast license term to eight years), 204
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of the explicit statements in the Communications Act of 1934 that

broadcast licenses not be considered property interests," the 1996 Act
requires the FCC to consider competing applications for broadcast licenses only after finding, pursuant to statutory factors, that the
incumbent's license should not be renewed." The Commission is in-

structed to grant the incumbent's renewal application if it finds that the
station, in the preceding term, has "served the public interest, convenience, and necessity;" 3 that there have been no "serious violations...
4 and that
of this Act or the rules and regulations of the Commission;""Z
the licensee has not engaged in any "other violations
. . . which, taken
5
together, would constitute a pattern of abuse."'
This statutory provision achieves with no fanfare the renewal reform unsuccessfully sought by broadcasters for the past twenty-seven
years. By contrast to 1969, the 1996 New York Times did not carry
editorials critical of the rule.' 6 The change was greeted with virtual
public silence.' 7 This strikingly different response was presumably large-

(amending the broadcast license renewal process). See also Implementation of Sections 204(a)
and 204(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,289 (1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1 & 73).
11. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613
(1994). Various provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 provide that broadcast licenses
create no property rights. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 301 ("no . . . licenses shall be construed to
create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license"); 47 U.S.C. § 309(h)
(a license "shall not vest in the licensee any right to operate the station . . . beyond the term
thereof"). See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
In addition, the Communications Act of 1934 had provided that decisions to renew licenses must be "governed by the same considerations and practice which affect the granting of
original applications." Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1084 (1934).
Congress deleted this language in 1952 and substituted the requirement that renewals be granted
if the "public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby." Communications
Act Amendments, 1952, § 5, 66 Stat. 714. See also 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1994); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 811 n.31 (1978) (describing 1952 amendment).
12. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 204(a)(l), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(3)(B).
13. Id § 204(a)(1), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(l)(A).
14. Id, § 204(a)(1), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(l)(B).
15. Id § 204(a)(1), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1)(C).
16. KRAsNow ET AL., supra note 1, at 211. See also Symposium, Panel Il: Implications of
the New TelecommunicationsLegislation, 6 FORDHAM INTELL PRop., MEDA & ENT. LJ. 517, 528,
576-78 (1996) [hereinafter Fordham Symposium] (comments of Antoinette Cook Bush) (characterizing the Act as "a unique piece of legislation in that it had so much industry support,
and very little direct consumer interest").
17. While some public interest groups filed comments calling for increased public interest
obligations in response to the FCC's docket proceeding on the extension of license terms, few
articles and little controversy appeared in the popular and trade press. See. e.g.. Chris
McConnell, Broadcasters Praise Plan for Longer License Tenns: Citzen Groups Mant Change
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ly due to the fact that broadcast licensing is only a grain of sand in the
lengthy and detailed 1996 Act. As Dean Krattenmaker points out, the
new Act is an over-arching piece of legislation designed to deal
architectonically with the broad contours of a converging telecommunications universe.1 8 It raises many more pressing issues than merely
broadcast license renewal. Broadcasting is no longer the center of the
regulatory universe; indeed, some could say that the few broadcast
provisions of the 1996 Act-including the licensing sections-are attempts to bolster a mature and weakening industry. 9
Telecommunications experts might also contest the substantive importance of the licensing provisions of the 1996 Act. Dean

Krattenmaker, for example, concludes that the licensing provisions of
the new Act are good in principle, but of "modest practical effect.""0
He begins with the observation that the statutory license term extension

and the renewal process reform "combine to grant virtually perpetual
licenses to all radio and television stations."'" This is, in his view, a
positive development: by "greatly lower[ing] the regulatory costs of
doing business as a broadcaster,"22 the legislation should lead to an
additional number of stations on the air, operating at lower rates and
therefore providing cheaper access.' Dean Krattenmaker suspects that
licensees could negotiate better long-term investments in programming
and talent by being able to "show lenders and investors that, so long as
they abide by the rules, they have a statutory right to a renewal (and

Tied to Increased Public Interest Requirements, BROADCASTING & CABLE, May 27, 1996, at 15;
FCC Asks Congressfor Help in Revising Regulations, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 3, 1995, 1995 WL
6455245 (simply noting plan to "simplify" broadcast license renewals). Cf Kim McAvoy, GOP
Wants to Revise License Renewal, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Mar. 13, 1995, at 12 (noting some
Democrats "balking" at renewal reform). In the scholarly context, a search of LEXIS generated
only citations praising the license renewal revisions of the Act. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Last
Picture Show: On the Twilight of Federal Mass Communications Regulation, 80 MINN. L. REV.
1415, 1440-43, 1488-89 (1996) (lambasting the FCC's comparative licensing process).
18. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV. 123,
129-31 (1996). Indeed, the preamble to the statute reads as follows: "[a]n Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference
characterizes the project as designed "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national
policy framework . . . " H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124.
19. See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, 29 CONN. L. REv. 289, 298 (1996).
20. Krattenmaker, supra note 18, at 157.
21. Id. at 133.
22. Id at 152.
23. Id. at 152.
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for a longer term)."24 Nevertheless, Dean Krattenmaker concludes that
the licensing provisions of the Act do not reform broadcast law and
policy very significantly because, "in practice, licensees who do not
flout the FCC or its rules always get their licenses renewed." The
new provisions do not engender much controversy because they have
been with us, de facto, for years.
In addition to his point-by-point evaluation of the pros and cons of
the changes made by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Dean
Krattenmaker's underlying complaint about the Act as a whole is the
variety of opportunities foregone by Congress. Broadcast licensing too
is an area in which Dean Krattenmaker might say that Congress passed
up opportunities. It addressed renewal, but said nothing about the process of initial licensing. In the renewal context, it explicitly abandoned
the option of a vigorous comparative renewal process. However, it did
not replace that process with a fully deregulatory model of licensing-an auction regime pursuant to which broadcast licenses would be
considered property interests subject only to the regulatory constraints
applicable to other commodities.26
Both the Act's affirmative provisions and its roads not taken teach
us something. Admittedly, although the comparative renewal process
may have had an unquantifiable deterrent effect on incumbent performance, Dean Krattenmaker is probably right that the change in the
hearing process at renewal is but a modest revision at the practical
level. But the change has important rhetorical and symbolic meaning
even if its practical significance is not seismic. In eliminating even the
aspirational norm of a full-fledged comparison of competing applicants
at the renewal stage, it abandons what was long articulated as a philosophical premise of the 1934 Communications Act: the FCC's role in
selecting the applicant "best" advancing the public interest, convenience,
and necessity.27 While I will argue that considerations of policy and
freedom of speech substantively support that abandonment, it is nevertheless wise to mark Congress' rejection of a procedural mechanism
designed to enhance programming competition.
24. d at 152-53.
25. Iadat 156-57.
26. Cf., e.g., Matthew Spitzer, The Constitutlonality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 NYU L
REv. 990, 1068-69 (1989) (arguing for a private property model).
27. Cf generally Loftus E. Becker, Jr, Comments on the "Telecommunlcatlons Act of 1996"
by Thomas G. Krattenmaker, 29 CONN. L REV. 175, 181-85 (1996) (arguing against fully mar-

ket- based approaches to telecommunications policy and noting society's need for education and
information through mass electronic media).
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Yet the significance of that rejection cannot now be assessed because Congress replaced the comparative renewal procedure with a significant amount of substantive FCC discretion. While the Act limited
social engineering via license distribution, it also eschewed the auction
model. Instead, Congress retained the public interest notion, but gave it
no explicit positive content. Perhaps unwittingly,2" it invited the possibility of direct pro-social content regulation. On the one hand, a fully
market-oriented, deregulatory FCC could use section 204 of the Act to
justify virtually automatic renewal of broadcasters in minimal compliance with technical and procedural FCC rules. If Dean Krattenmaker is
right that the legislation prompts nothing more than the adoption of a
low threshold for perpetual broadcast licensees whose fitness is judged
by a mere rule-compliance standard,29 then the 1996 Act's process
change puts into question the extent to which the airwaves can continue
to be characterized as public property and broadcasters be called public
trustees.
On the other hand, this FCC, under Chairman Reed Hundt, may
take the legislation's openness seriously. It may replace structural regulation indirectly designed to promote the public interest with an enhanced and content-based set of public interest obligations. These obligations may be crafted as targeted, limited, and directly content-based
requirements-such as children's educational programming and reduced
violence-based on Congressional findings of failures in broadcast programming. They could be programming elements of a new "deal" with
broadcasters in return for the privilege of free and exclusive broadcast
licenses.3" The intellectual fulcrum of this new model of administration
would be neither property nor the First Amendment. Instead, the fundamental touchstones could be contract and antitrust. Regulation would be
warranted only in those speech contexts that are subject to market failure. It would be justified in the rhetoric of social contracts: in exchange for the low cost use of a public resource, broadcasters would
agree to limited social obligations.
Dean Krattenmaker points to the meta-picture of the 1996 Act as a
striking combination of pro-competitive structural deregulation and con-

28. But see infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
29. Krattenmaker, supra note 18, at 152.
30. Reed Hundt & Karen Kombluh, Renewing the Deal Between Broadcasters and the Public: Requiring Clear Rules for Children's Educational Television, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 11

(1996).
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tent controls." Broadcast licensing may provide a fruitful-and troubling-venue in which to see that combination unfold.
I.

FROM COMPARISON TO COMPLIANCE-THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
ELIMiNATION OF THE COMPARATIVE RENEWAL HEARING

The House Report on that part of the telecommunications legislation
that was ultimately passed as the broadcast licensing portion of the
Telecommunications Act of 199632 characterized the renewal provision
as little more than a procedural change: "The Committee believes this
change in procedure will lead to a more efficient method of renewing
broadcast licenses and should result in a significant cost saving to the
' The Committee appeared to ground this conclusion on
Commission."33
the fact that the legislation:
does not alter the standard of renewal employed by the Commission and does not jeopardize the ability of the public to
participate actively in the renewal process through the use of
petitions to deny and informal complaints. Further, this section
in no way limits the ability of the Commission to act sua sponte in enforcing the Act or Commission rules."
The Joint Explanatory statement of the Committee of Conference does
not discuss the rationales for the change.35
Despite claims of merely procedural effects, the elimination of the
comparative renewal process signals an ideological change. Public interest renewal-whatever the standards to be used-is no longer even
aspirationally to be a process of picking the best available applicant,
but is rather to be one of making sure that the incumbent is "good
enough." The process-which was initially designed to be comparative

31. Krattenmaker, supra note 18.
32. The conference agreement adopted the House provisions with modifications to include the
Senate provision requiring renewal applicants to attach a summary of comments regarding violent programming. See KR. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, reprinted n 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 178.
33. See HR. CONF. REP. No. 104-204, reprinted in 1996 US.C.C.A.N. 10, 91. The same
attitude is reflected in the FCC's characterization. FCC, Telecommunications Act of 1996 Enacts
21 Proposals to "Reinvent" Agency, 1996 FCC LEXIS 665 (Feb. 8, 1996) (noting that Act will
"streamline" and "simplify" license renewal).
34. See H.PR. CONF. REP. NO. 104-204, reprinted n 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 91.
35. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, HR. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, reprinted in 1996 US.C.C.A.N. 124, 178.
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and lead to the selection of the "better" candidate--is now a pass/fail
test for the incumbent alone. The effect of the procedural change that
eliminates comparative renewal hearings is that there is no possibility of

a comparison with regard either to performance or to any other comparative factor as between the incumbent licensee and a challenger.36 So
long as the incumbent even minimally meets whatever substantive standards have been established by the Commission for a basic renewal,
there will be no comparison with an applicant with different-and per-

haps better-promises. Furthermore, the Act virtually invites the FCC
to grant short-term renewals (instead of flat denials of license) even to
malefactors who have not met the statutory standards for renewal."

The legislative history of the 1996 Act suggests that the revision of
renewal procedures is not a significant change because petitions to deny
are still open as avenues for public comment on the question of whether an incumbent deserves renewal.3" However, petitions to deny are not
perfect substitutes for comparative hearings between challengers and
incumbents. First, they present procedural obstacles. Although members
of the public can file petitions to deny an incumbent licensee's renewal
application for failure to operate in the public interest,39 the Communi-

36. Comparative criteria need not relate only to programming; they can also focus on whether one or another applicant has an ownership structure more in keeping with the FCC's goal,
for example, of diversity.
37. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 204(a)(2), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(2), provides
that if a licensee "fails to meet the requirements of this subsection, the Commission may deny
the application for renewal . . . or grant such application on terms and conditions as are appropriate, including renewal for a term less than the maximum otherwise permitted." Even more
tellingly, § 204(a)(3) of the Act, adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(3), in setting forth the standards
for denial of renewal applications, provides that the FCC can issue a denial order after a hearing and a finding "that no mitigating factors justify the imposition of lesser sanctions," Id. at §
204(a)(3).
38. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-204 at 123, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 91. As
noted above, the Senate bill (S. 652) was passed in lieu of the House bill (H.R. 1555) after its
language was amended to contain much of the House bill text. The House Report on H.R.
1555 contains the following assessment: "The Committee notes that subsection (k) . . . does
not jeopardize the ability of the public to participate in the renewal process through the use of
petitions to deny and informal complaints." Id.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d). Citizen standing was granted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
in the WLBT case in 1966. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting our traditional dependence on members of the public
to be private attorneys general). Obviously, the comparative challenge alone would not suffice.
As the court noted in the process of granting citizen standing in renewal proceedings, "even
when there are multiple competing stations in a [market], various factors may operate to inhibit
the other broadcasters from opposing a renewal application. An imperfect rival may be thought
a desirable rival, or there may be a 'gentleman's agreement' of deference to a fellow broadcaster in the hope he will reciprocate on a propitious occasion." Id at 1004. It should also be
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cations Act of 1934 requires such petitioners to make a prima facie
showing-based on specific allegations of fact--that the grant would
not be in the public interest."
Second, other than "family values" groups focused on sex and vio-

lence in programming, few public interest groups now serve as media
watchdogs. As a result of the convergence of the mass media as de-

scribed by Dean Krattenmaker, 4" existing funding for public interest
challenges is spread thinly over many other issues. Therefore, because

the broadcasting system is no longer so central and because support for
public interest challenges is scarce, it is unlikely that petitions to deny
would fully take up the slack left by the elimination of the traditional

comparative challenge. In addition, although petitions to deny by public
interest groups are generally not primarily spurred by the desire for
economic settlements,42 the FCC's attempts to eliminate what it calls
abuses in the comparative hearing and petition to deny processes sug-

gest that there currently remain very few economic incentives for
groups to mount challenges even to minimally qualified incumbent
licensees.' Moreover, the FCC held in the radio and television deregu-

noted that § 204(a)(2) of the Act (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)) amends §
309(d) to assure that standards for petitions to deny conform to the statutory renewal standards
set up in the new § 309(k). Implementation Order, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,289 (1996).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d). See also Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 779 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1985). On the difficulties faced by petitioners to deny, see, e.g.,
Ronald W. Fairchild, Note, Use of Petitions By Mlnorlo, Groups to Deny Broadcast License
Renewals, 1978 DUKE LJ. 271, 272-74, 284-85 (1978); Ronald W. Fairchild, Comment, Peitioning to Deny Broadcast License Renewals, 16 WASHBURN U. 375, 376-81 (1977).
41. See Krattenmaker, supra note 18, at 125-27.
42. First Report & Order, Abuses of the Renewal Process, 4 FCC Red 4780, 4785 (1989),
recon. denied, 5 FCC Red 3902 (1990).
43. In a series of attempts to curb the strategic use of the comparative process for economic
gain in both the renewal and new facilities contexts, the FCC limited the circumstances in
which challengers can obtain cash settlements for withdrawal of their comparative challenges or
petitions to deny. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In
re Formulation of Policies and Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Competing
Applicants, and Other Participants to the Comparative Renewal Process and to the Prevention of
Abuses of the Renewal Process, 3 FCC Red 5179 (1988) [hereinafter Second Further Notice of
Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking]; First Report & Order, Abuses of the Renewal Process, supra
note 42, at 4785.
In comparative renewals, for example, the rules prohibit any payment to competing applicants who seek to dismiss their applications prior to the Initial Decision stage. See 47 C.F.R. §
73.3523(b)(1). Thereafter, such dismissal payments cannot exceed the withdrawing party's legitimate and prudent expenses in the comparative process. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3523(c). The limitation
to legitimate and prudent expenses applies to settlements of petitions to deny as well. In addition, the FCC reviews, on a case by case basis, citizens' agreements reached in exchange for
withdrawals of petitions to deny. First Report & Order, Abuses of the Renewal Process, supra
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lation decisions that stations facing petitions to deny can rely on the
programming provided by other stations in the overall market in order
to justify their own specialization and failure to program for all market
concerns.' This further dilutes the likelihood of successful petitions to
deny. It therefore reduces the incentives for public interest groups,
whose resources are already thinly spread, to participate in the petition
process at the broadcast level.
Finally, while the petition to deny can be a useful tool, it cannot
realistically redress mediocre or acceptable, but not superior, broadcast
service. The FCC has in the past emphasized the importance of broadcast service and the value of even minimal service over lack of service.45 The argument that a broadcaster's programming should be better

note 42, at 4780-86 (describing differences in economic incentives for competitors and petitioners to deny.) See also Public Notice, FCC Waives Limitations on Payments to Dismissing Applicants in Universal Settlements of Cases Subject to Comparative Proceedings Freeze Policy, 10
FCC Rcd 12182 (1995) (announcing temporary waiver of 47 C.F.RI §§ 73.3523(b)(1) and
733525(a)(3)); Goldin, supra note 3, at 1025 (discussing challengers' concrete economic Incentives for critical scrutiny of licensee performance).
44. Deregulation of Radio, 84 FCC 2d 968 (1981), recons. denied, 87 FCC 2d 797 (1981),
affd in part United Church of Christ v. FCC , 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983)[hereinafler
Deregulation of Radio]; Report & Order, In re the Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial
Television Stations, 98 FCC 2d 1076, 1094, 56 Rad. Reg. 1005, 1019 (1984), recons. denied,
104 FCC 2d 357 (1986), affd in part, ACT v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Television Deregulation]. See also Office of Communications of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
45. See, e.g., In re Applications of Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 FCC 1149, 1175-76
(1951); H.R. REP. No. 961, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974). See also Committee for Open
Media v. FCC, 543 F.2d 861, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that petitions to deny are
disfavored because minimal service is better than none); Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515
F.2d 684, 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting that the value of minimal service would not be
relevant in the comparative-hearing context where the issue is not the existence of service but
who shall provide it), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975); Gehring, supra note 7, at 597 n.127
(noting that the availability of a qualified applicant can encourage the FCC to deny renewal to
an incumbent whose substandard performance is not sufficiently egregious to warrant complete
loss of service by unconditional denial of renewal); Wentz, supra note 7, at 401 (discussing
tendency of FCC to renew in petition to deny contexts because of uncertainty about substitute
service).
The petition to deny may be less desirable than a competitive challenge with regard to
diversification factors as well as performance issues. For example, in Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d
556 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court upheld the FCC's refusal to hold a hearing to deny a license
renewal on the claimed grounds of fairness doctrine violations and insufficient diversification.
With regard to the diversification issue, the court found that the level of cross-ownership of the
renewal applicant satisfied the then-current multiple ownership rules of the Commission and that
ordering a hearing would have been tantamount to a hearing on the desirability of those rules.
Had this been a situation with a competing applicant, however, the incumbent's ownership
structure would have been compared to the challenger's and might have led to demerits even if

19961

NOT WITH A BANG BUT A WHIMPER

is unlikely to sway the FCC in the absence of a live alternative to the
incumbent. Admittedly, a desirable frequency should lead to an active
initial licensing process when it becomes vacant, but the transition costs
may still deter FCC non-renewal without a qualified challenger ready to
step in immediately.
Nevertheless, that the petition to deny process may not be a full
substitute for comparative renewal hearings does not mean that the
renewal provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is therefore
necessarily undesirable. The adequacy of the renewal provision should
be addressed in light of the historical background of comparative renewal.
A. History of Comparative RenewalP6
1. The 1970 Policy Statement in Context:
The 1934 Communications Act commands the Commission to grant
license renewals only when they serve the public interest.47 That mandate has been generally understood to require the agency to make the
best choice in the public interest48 and to employ a comparative process
at least in form. In its 1970 Policy Statement, the FCC revised the
conventional comparative format of the renewal scheme.49 Like the renewal provision in the 1996 Act, the 1970 Policy Statement gave a
conclusive comparative preference to an incumbent who could show
that its program service during the preceding license term had been
"substantially attuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area"
and that the station's operation "ha[d] not otherwise been characterized
by serious deficiencies."5 Thus, while the hearing would still be comparative in form, a showing of substantial past performance without
serious deficiencies would preclude further consideration of any challengers on their own merits.
The backdrop for the 1970 Policy Statement was the Commission's
it were independently adequate under then-current rules of the FCC.
46. The story of comparative broadcast renewals has been ably told in numerous sources.

See, e.g., KRASNOW Er AL., supra note I, at 207-32; Second Further Notice of Inquiry &
Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5186-88. I will provide a mere sketch here.
47. 47 U.S.C. §307(c) (1994).
48. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL L REV. 1101, 1122-23

(1993).
49. In re Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 FCC 2d 424 (1970), rev'd sub nom Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC 447
F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

50. Id at 425.
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surprise non-renewal of incumbent television station WHDH in 1969.1
Even though the station's performance record was "favorable on the
' it lost out
whole,"52
to a candidate with more desirable ownership char-

acteristics pursuant to other comparative criteria.53 Despite FCC attempts
to cabin the significance of WHDH by subsequently focusing on the
unique characteristics of the case,5 4 an unsettled broadcast industry

sought Congressional action.55 When public challenges eroded the likelihood of legislation mandating a two-step renewal process,5 6 the FCC

issued the 1970 Policy Statement reforming its comparative renewal
process. Although the 1970 Policy Statement did not go as far as the

stalled legislation toward eliminating comparative renewal,57 it attempted
to assuage industry worries by adopting the conclusive preference for

51. In re WHDH, Inc., 16 FCC 2d 1 (1969), recon. denied, 17 FCC 2d 856 (1969), affd
sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
52. Id. at 10.
53. See id, at 19. WHDH was a subsidiary of the Boston Herald Traveler newspaper. The
diversification demerit which derailed renewal was based on this common ownership. See Id. at
12-13.
54. On rehearing, the FCC issued a clarification, explaining that the lack of renewal expectancy was due to WHDH's unique status as a short-term licensee operating under a series of
special temporary authorizations because of possible misconduct by its president. In re WHDH,
Inc., 17 FCC 2d 856, 872-73 (1969), aff'd, Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d 841
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
55. See KRASNOW Er AL., supra note I, at 210-11; In re Petitions by BEST et al. for Rule
Making to Clarify Standards in All Comparative Broadcast Proceedings, 24 FCC 2d 383, 389
(1970) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
56. See KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 1, at 212-14.
57. As noted above, the 1970 Policy Statement was issued in response to strong political
pressure to solidify the renewal expectancy. The then-pending Senate bill to achieve renewal
reform-the Pastore bill--would have gone further than the Policy Statement by providing that
the FCC could not consider competing applications at all until after first finding that the incumbent would disserve the public interest. See Anthony, supra note 6, at 107-09. Under this
proposal, there would be a two-step process and the first step would not be comparative even
in form. See KRASNOW ET AL., supra note 1, at 214-15 (describing S. 2004); In re Policy
Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 FCC 2d
424, 424-25 (1970), rev'd sub nom. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201,
1208 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (setting out the applicable standards of the policy). Procedurally, under
the 1970 Policy Statement, the question of substantial past performance was to be a threshold
issue in a comparative hearing involving both the incumbent and the challenger, but limited to
the single issue of past performance. If the incumbent were to prevail on this threshold issue
and obtain the renewal preference, all other applications would be dismissed without a hearing
on their own merits. If the incumbent were not to prevail on the substantial past performance
criterion, the standard comparative hearing would take place. Yet, despite these procedural differences, the CCC court thought that the 1970 Policy Statement "administratively enact[ed] what
the Pastore bill sought to do." Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1210
(D.C. Cir. 1971). But see Geller, supra note 3, at 487 (criticizing this reading).

19961

NOT WTH A BANG BUTA WHIAPER

substantial past performance.

This 1970 Policy Statement was forcefully invalidated in Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC's on the ground that it violated section

309 of the 1934 Act. The court relied on legislative history, the Supreme Court's decision in Ashbacker v. FCC,59 and its own decision in
Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC' ° to find that the bifurcated renewal
process of the 1970 Policy Statement deprived qualified challenging

applicants of the right to be heard on the merits of their applications-a right to a full-fledged and fully comparative hearing guaranteed by the Communications Act.6 In all three sources, the Citizens
Communications Center court saw a mandate that the renewal process
be a truly comparative exercise in finding the best applicant.62 Such a
selection exercise would require a comparison of all characteristics of
the applicants, and not merely the threshold establishment of specific
"positive characteristics," so long as all the applicants were minimally

58. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), clarified in 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
59. 326 U.S. 327 (1945). Citizens Communications Ctr. appealed from the 1970 Policy Statement on the grounds that it violated the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), and the Communications Act as interpreted in Ashbacker. See generally Citizens Communications Ctr., 447 F.2d at 1201-03. The APA violation claim was grounded on the notion
that as a new rule, the Policy Statement should have been subjected to notice and comment
rule-making rather than simply adopted as a policy statement. Id at 1203. With regard to the
Communications Act, the plaintiffs charged that the conclusive presumption process would violate § 309(e) as interpreted in Ashbacker. Id at 1204.
60. 175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
61. The court did not reach the other grounds urged by the plaintiff.
62. The court quoted that part of the Federal Radio Commission's C'FRC's") 1928 report to
Congress in which the agency characterized the public interest standard as a "comparative ...
standard ....
[Due to channel scarcity,] the Commission must determine from among the
applicants before it which of them will, if licensed, best serve the public." Citizens Communicalions Ctr., 447 F.2d at 1206-07 (quoting Federal Radio Commission, Second Annual Report to
Congress 169 (October 1, 1928)).
With respect to case precedent, the Citizens Communications Ctr. court relied on
Ashbacker and Johnston despite the fact that they involved mutually exclusive applications at
the initial license assignment stage rather than in the renewal context. The court read Ashbacker
to require a full comparative hearing where two or more applicants for licenses are mutually
exclusive. Id. at 1211. It then characterized Johnston as defining a full heaing to include "a
decision upon all relevant criteria" to determine the better qualified applicant Id. at 1212.
63. Citizens Communications Ctr.,
447 F.2d at 1212 (quoting Johnston Broad. Co. v. FCC,
175 F.2d 351, 356-57 (1949)). In Johnston, the court had reasoned that: "[a] choice between
two applicants .. . involves a comparison of characteristics. Both A & B may be qualified,
but if a choice must be made, the questions is which is the better qualified ...which would
better serve [the public] interest" Johnston, 175 F.2d at 356 (1949). According to the Johnston
court, "the nature of the material, the findings and the bases for conclusion differ" when the
question is whether an applicant is qualified as opposed to "when the purpose is to make a
proper choice between two qualified applicants." Id. Elements that might not be essential to
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qualified.
The Citizens Communications Center court, which expressed concern about the 1970 Policy Statement's deterrent effect on the filing of
renewal challenges," clearly painted the comparative process as a mechanism for the selection of the better candidate through "healthy competition." 5' In the court's view, abandoning a comparative approach in the
attempt to find the better applicant would jeopardize important communications policies. Specifically, the court feared that the 1970 Policy
Statement's substantial performance standard would preclude comparative evaluations designed to enhance diversification of media ownership
and the entry of minority groups into broadcasting." Indeed, the Citizens Communications Center decision assumed that the effect of the
1970 Policy Statement "would certainly have been to perpetuate [the]
dismaying situation" in which "no more than a dozen of 7,500 broad7
cast licenses issued are owned by racial minorities."'6
2.

The Role of Renewal Expectancy

The Citizens Communication Center court's requirement of a full
comparative hearing on license renewal did not specify either the factors or the standards to be considered. Records suggest that in the
1920s, during the heyday of AM-band congestion, the Federal Radio
Commission ("FRC" or "Commission") frequently denied license renewals.68 Subsequently, however, such renewals became de rigueur.69 Debasic qualification could become dispositive when choosing "between two applicants otherwise

equally able." Id. In a gestalt-like finding, "[lit must take into account all the characteristics
which indicate differences, and reach an over-all relative determination upon an evaluation of

all factors, conflicting in many cases. In its judgment upon this evaluation, the Commission has
wide discretion." Id at 357.
64. Citizens Communications Ctr., 447 F.2d at 1206, 1214.
65. Id. at 1214.

66. Id. at 1213 & n.36.
67. Id. On the positive side, it quoted a report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights to
the effect that comparative licensing proceedings are "an effective mechanism for bringing about

greater racial and ethnic sensitivity in programming, non-discriminatory employment practices,
and other affirmative changes which otherwise might not take place." Id. at 1214 n.38 (quoting
report). See also Gehring, supra note 7, at 597 (describing the hope of comparative renewal
proponents that the process could open the broadcasting industry to racial minorities and other
previously excluded social groups).
68. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, MASS MEDIA LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 648

(5th ed. 1995); Citizens Communications Cr., 447 F.2d at 1207; See Simons, supra note 7, at
863-64; Wentz, supra note 7, at 370-71.
69. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, AMERICAN BROADcASTiNG AND THm FIRST AMENDMENr 85-86 (1987)
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spite the clarity of the proposition that broadcast licensees do not have
property rights in their licenses, 70 cases and FCC decisions uniformly
assumed that the license "is more than a mere privilege or gratuity."'
Although renewal proceedings required comparing the incumbent's
performance with the promises made by the challenging party, the

Commission expressed a significant preference for incumbents. Courts
and the FCC both read a "renewal expectancy" notion as implicit in the
structure of the Communications Act of 1934.72

(on the decreasing threat of non-renewal); Wentz, supra note 7, at 371. According to one
study, although non-renewals increased in the 1970's, only 78 licenses had not been renewed
by the FCC during the period 1934 to 1969. John D. Abel et a], Station License Revocatlons
and Denials of Renewal, 1934-1969, 14 J. BROwA As G 411, 411 (1970); Frederic A. Weiss et
al., Station License Revocations and Denials of Renewal, 1970-78, 24 J. BROADCASTIG 69, 69
(1980). See also Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting
that no television licensee had ever been denied renewal); Central Fla. Enters, Inc. v. FCC,
598 F2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (on FCC's history of a "strong preference for renewal").
70. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); see generally supra
note 11.
71. L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 397 F.2d 717, 798 (1948). See also Central Fla. Enters, 683
F.2d at 506 and authorities cited therein (recognizing the permissibility of some degree of renewal expectancy).
72. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). Early precedent supported this view. See Second Further Notice
of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5187 & n.75; WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153
F.2d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 223 (1946) (referring to
"compelling reasons" as basis for denying renewal to stations satisfactorily serving listeners);
Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. FCC, 105 F.2d 793, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ("the public interest
requires . . . that existing arrangements be not disturbed without reason*). See Note, Comparative License Renewal Hearings and the Protection of the "Public Interest:" Central Florida
Enterprises v. FCC, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1801, 1805-06 (1979) [hereinafter Comparative License]
(noting the Commission's "consistent preference" for incumbents over the 45-year history of
comparative renewal hearings); Simons, supra note 7, at 863-64 (describing early precedent
recognizing presumptions in favor of license renewals for satisfactory incumbents). Later authorities also relied on the 1952 amendments to §307, which substituted the public interest standard
for the prior mandate that renewals and new license applications be judged by the same considerations. See supra note 11. (The extent to which this 1952 amendment was seen as an endorsement of a strong renewal expectancy and the FCC's tilt in favor of incumbents is a subject of dispute. For articles taking this view, see Geller, supra note 3, at 497; Hyde supra note
7, at 260; Comparative License, supra at 1806 n.38). According to the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Congress apparently amended the provision to preclude the inference that an incumbent
could not adduce evidence of its past broadcast record. Central Fla. Enters, Inc. v. FCC, 598
F.2d 37, 41 nA (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Court in FCC v. National Cltl'ens Comm. for Broad
quoted the amendment's legislative history to the effect that the earlier language was unrealistic
and failed to reflect Commission renewal practice, and that the FCC had the "right and duty"
to consider the overall performance of an incumbent station "against the broad standard" of the
public interest. 436 U.S. 775, 811 & n31 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 44, 82 Cong., 1st Sess.
7 (1951)). The Court concluded that "Congress appears to have lent its approval to the
Commission's policy of evaluating existing licensees on a someNhat different basis from new
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In articulating the reason for such a renewal expectancy in Hearst
Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 73 the Commission emphasized that failing to con-

sider an incumbent's past broadcast record would not be in the public
interest. Thus, the Commission stated that it would

weigh

an

incumbent's past broadcast record along with other traditional comparative factors.74 Although the Commission's language in Hearst Radio"
and Wabash Valley Broadcasting (WTHI- 776 did not attribute conclusive weight to past programming, the cases came to be widely understood as justifying almost automatic renewal of incumbents, even in
the comparative hearing context, if they were not guilty of miscon77
duct.

Formally, the renewal expectancy was only one of the comparative
considerations entertained by the Commission in challenged renewals. 8
The other comparative factors were borrowed from the initial licensing
context and paralleled the development of initial comparative criteria.
Although Ashbacker established the necessity of the comparative hearing for mutually exclusive initial applicants, it did not define the substantive standards for comparison. Thus, until 1965, the Commission resolved hearings on an ad hoe basis, without established lists of comparative criteria or weights for the factors. 9 The comparative factors rele-

vant in initial licensing hearings were systematized and articulated in
the FCC's 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings.8" Even

applicants." Id. at 810-11. See also Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking,
supra note 43, at 5186-87; Geller, supra note 3, at 472-75 (on the legislative history of Section 307(d) of the Communications Act); Comparative License at 1806. The renewal expectancy
notion was recognized and noted in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad.. 436 U.S. at
782 n.5, 805-06 (1978) in the Court's discussion of the FCC's newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership policy.
73. Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL) v. FCC, 15 FCC 1149, 1175 (1951).
74. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5186.
75. Hearst Radio, 15 FCC at 1175-76.
76. 35 FCC 677 (1973).
77. See Anthony, supra note 6, at 106; Geller, supra note 3, at 475-476; Goldin, supra note
3, at 1020; Hyde, supra note 7, at 267; Jaffe, supra note 7, at 1694; Wentz, supra note 7, at
380-82. In Hearst Radio, for example, the incumbent had not integrated ownership and management and controlled an FM station, a television station and a newspaper in Baltimore. 15 FCC
at 1183 (1951). Nevertheless "the clear advantage of continuing the established and excellent
service now furnished by WBAL", was determinative. Id.
78. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5187.
79. See id at 5187; Hyde, supra note 7, at 261-64; Robert J. Brinkmann, Note, The Policy
Paralysis in WESH: A Conflict Between Structure and Operations In the FCC Comparative
Renewal Process, 32 FED. COM. LJ. 55, 58-59 (1980).
80. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 FCC 2d 393 (1965). See Second
Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking Case, supra note 43, at 5185, 5187 (describ-
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though that Statement was inapplicable in its terms to the renewal context, 81 its structural comparative criteria of diversification of ownership

and integration of ownership and management were subsequently borrowed in comparative renewals. 2 However, despite the formally comparative process, the FCC consistently favored renewal applications in
challenge situations until its initial decision in WHDH.

Renewal applications were preferred because the comparative renewal process required an uncomfortable balancing of two policy concerns.8 3 On the one hand, the process was designed to serve as a "com-

petitive spur" for better programming." The threat of displacement by
challengers promising better service was considered the right mechanism
to prompt broadcasters to provide programming in the public interest
and to discipline broadcaster incentives to air inadequate fare.s On the
other hand, the FCC saw at least three good reasons in the public interest to maintain some stability and predictability in the broadcast industry. First, the Commission found that "an expectation of renewal is necessary to encourage broadcasters to make investments that would ensure
quality programming.""

Second, the Commission saw no guarantee that

a challenger's promised "paper proposals" would match an incumbent's
actual past performance record, and feared that replacing an incumbent

could result in substituting inferior for acceptable service.87 Finally, the
ing comparative criteria).
81. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I FCC 2d at 393 n.1 (1965).
82. Seven (7) League Productions, Inc., 1 FCC 2d at 1597 (1965) (holding that the 1965
Policy Statement would also govern the introduction of evidence in comparative renewal hearings). See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hyde,
supra note 7, at 266-67; See Comparative License, supra note 72, at 1802 & n.7.
83. See, e.g., Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at
5185.
84. See id at 5185; See also In re Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving
Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 FCC 2d 424, 424-25 (1970) ("statutory spur").
85. See Second Further Notice of Inquhy & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5185.
"Specifically, by permitting challengers to file competing applications at the end of an incumbent licensee's renewal term, it was thought that broadcasters would have the incentive to put
forward their best programming efforts at serving the needs and interests of their communities
of license so that they would be able to prevail in the event there were a comparative license
renewal hearing." Id
86. See id at 5185 (noting FCC's prior rationale that "comparative renewal proceedings cannot function as a 'competitive spur' to licensees if their dedication to the community is not rewarded."). See also Notice of Inquiry, In re Matter of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 88 FCC 2d 120, 123 (1981)
(on comparative renewal reform); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 858
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (expectancies provided to induce investments, thus furthering the public interest).
87. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5185-
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Commission worried that the public interest would not be served by a
"haphazard restructuring" of the broadcast industry that might result
from comparing incumbents and challengers as if they were both new
applicants on equal footing."
Although the Citizens Communications Center decision required
full-fledged comparative renewal hearings and rejected the FCC's summary procedure introduced in the 1970 Policy Statement, the court
specifically recognized the legitimacy of stability arguments and did not
eliminate the notion of a renewal expectancy. Rather, it conceded that
superior performance, while not the single dispositive factor, "should be
a plus of major significance in renewal proceedings." 9 The Citizens
Communications Center court did not itself define the standard to be
used for renewal expectancy. It did note that "superior" performance
ordinarily meant "far above the average," 90 and gave some hints as to
what might satisfy such a standard. 9'
Despite the strength of this language, the rationale for renewal
expectancy remained powerful for the FCC. Although the agency paid
lip service to the comparative hearing requirement, the renewal expectancy remained a virtually dispositive factor. 92 Critics claimed that the
FCC manipulated the comparative hearing requirement by undervaluing
non-renewal expectancy factors. 93 The FCC's performance threshold for

86. See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 805, 807 (1978);
Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL) v. FCC, 15 FCC 1149, 1175 (1951).
88. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5186;
Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that rulemaking is "preferable to ad hoc license renewal proceedings as an occasion
for restructuring the broadcast industry." Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 53
n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 957 (1979).
89. Citizens Communications Ctr. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In addition, in footnote 35, the court also suggested that the FCC commence rulemaking proceedings
"to articulate the standards by which to judge superior performance," Id. at 1213 n.35. Without
such articulated standards, the court feared that the incumbent would have a temptation "to
lapse into mediocrity and seek the protection of the crowd." Id.
90. 463 F.2d 822, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Webster's Dictionary).
91. Id. The Court's suggestions--of reduced commercials and "quality programs"-were substantive and did not shy away from content Id.
92. See Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (indicating
that the FCC had in the past raised renewal expectancy to an irrebuttable presumption in favor
of the incumbent); Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Gehring, supra note 7, at 592-93 (charging that the result of Citizens Communications Cir. has
not been to stop the Commission from applying the 1970 Policy Statement, but merely to stop
it from admitting it is doing so).
93. See, e.g., Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting
the conversion of diversification and integration from structural to functional inquiries), See also
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renewal expectancy was also subject to fluctuation.' Although the
Commission declined to adopt quantitative guidelines for its renewal

standard, it established in its 1977 Report that renewal expectancies
would depend on the degree to which the incumbent's past programming was "sound, favorable, and substantially above a level of mediocre service which might just minimally warrant renewal." ' 5 This substantial performance standard was to be a factor in the comparative
hearing, along with the factors enumerated in the 1965 Policy Statement.96 The weight to be accorded to the legitimate renewal expectancy

would depend on the facts of each case (as would the significance of
the other comparative considerations), presumably depending on how
good the past performance would be shown to be.9"

Recently, the Commission's statement of the basis of renewal exFCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 810-11 (1978) (recognizing diminished importance of diversification in renewals); Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed
Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5188; See Comparat'e License, supra note 72, at 1804, 1807
(on skewing effect of functional approach).
94. See Brinkmann, supra note 79, at 69-70.
95. Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant Stemming from the
Comparative Hearing Process, 66 FCC 2d 419, 430 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Report], aff'd sub
non. National Black Media Coalition v FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The FCC had
commenced a notice of inquiry in 1971 to address the question of the adoption of quantitative
standards for local programming, news and public affairs. See Notice of Inquiry in Docket No.
19154, 27 FCC 2d 580 (1971); Further Notice of Inquiry, 31 FCC 2d 443 (1971); Second
Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 367 (1973), Third Further
Notice of Inquiry, 43 FCC 2d 1043 (1973). After six years of inquiry, in its 1977 Report, the
FCC finally decided not to adopt quantitative criteria for the renewa expectancy. It did so for
a number of reasons. First, since meeting the proposed program guidelines would only be a
prima facie indication of substantial service (which could be upset on a further evidentiary
showing), quantitative standards would not, in fact, provide a high level of certainty. 1977 Report, supra at 428. Moreover, as the guidelines provided a range of permissible programming
percentages, selecting the precise standard from the range would predictably become a point of
contention and undermine certainty. Id. In any event, even a clear history of substantial service
would not guarantee renewal, since any preference awarded for it could not terminate the hearing in favor of the incumbent licensee. Id. Moreover, many stations might spread their resources thinner in order to comply with the standards, thus potentially reducing program quality.
And finally, the FCC feared that since licensees would predictably adopt the FCC's articulated
quantitative standards as their minimum standard for this type of programming, they would
interfere with licensee programming discretion without a showing of a clear and substantial
public interest benefit. Id
96. 1977 Report, supra note 95, at 430. The Commission further clarified by stating that the
focus initially would be on the renewal applicant's program service during the preceding license
term. Some of the elements that would be considered particularly relevant were the licensee's
responsiveness to ascertained community needs (including minority interest concerns), and its
broadcast of news, public affairs, and local programming, as well as cultural, educational, foreign-language, prime-time, children's, agricultural, and religious programming. Id.
97. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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pectancy has been whether the licensee's past broadcast service has

been "meritorious in meeting the needs and interests of listeners or
viewers in its community of license and service area."98 The renewal
expectancy carries "significant weight" when evaluated against the

structural factors of integration and diversification in the 1965 Policy
Statement.9 9 "Even greater weight may be accorded to this renewal
expectancy if a licensee's past record is found to be superior."'0 0
Despite what might be deemed the FCC's disingenuous and illusory
adherence to the dictates of Citizens Communications Center, the D.C.

Circuit at first accepted the Commission's approach."i Thereafter, in
CentralFlorida ,102 the D.C. Circuit scathingly criticized the FCC's renewal conclusions, based on "administrative 'feel,"' for being arbitrary
and opaque to judicial review.' 3 Notwithstanding the language in Citizens Communications Center implying the "superior performance" trigger for renewal expectancy, however, the D.C. Circuit subsequently

conceded that renewal expectancies could derive from merely substantial
or meritorious service.'

Indeed, the court in Central Florida 111°5 af-

98. Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5185.
99. Id at 5185. The Commission has previously suggested that primary reliance on diversification as a comparative criterion in the renewal context could "unfairly disadvantage" incumbents with good programming records who are in compliance with the FCC's multiple ownership rules but might still not have as diversified a firm structure as a challenger. Id. at 51885189. See also David Solomon, Cellular Radio Comparative Renewal Proceedings: A Legislative
Proposalfor Elimination, 39 FED. COM. LJ. 195, 202 nA0 (1987) (arguing in the cellular
context that without a renewal expectancy, "a challenger with no other media interests could
almost always beat an incumbent."). In affirming the FCC's authority to "grandfather" most
existing broadcast-newspaper combinations, the Supreme Court characterized the FCC's practice
in the renewal context as similarly weighing diversification as a "somewhat secondary factor" as
compared to past performance. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 809.
See also id. at 806.
100. Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5185 ("the
weight of the renewal expectancy is measured on a sliding scale in accord with the strength of
the licensee's past broadcast record").
101. See, e.g., Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 926 (1975). See also Gehring, supra note 7, at 593 (on the manipulation of facts and
comparative factors to reach the conclusion that the two applicants in Fidelity were equal).
102. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
103. Id Judge Wilkey condemned decision-making by administrative intuition as falling
"somewhere on the distant side of arbitrary." Id.
104. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court did
say that the strength of the expectancy would depend on the merit of the past record. Id. Any
lack of clarity in the opinion has been attributed by commentators to the fact that the court
amended its initial opinion to take account of the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broad., in which the Court characterized the FCC as having "recognized
that a licensee who has given meritorious service has a 'legitimate renewal expectanc[y]'." 436
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firmed the FCC's interpretation of the full hearing required under Citizens Communications Center.'°" So long as the Commission did not
"raisel renewal expectancy to an irrebuttable presumption in favor of
the incumbent,"" °7 and so long as it weighed all the factors at the same
time and with an eye to the public interestIes it could permissibly attribute renewal expectancies of varying strength and weight depending
on the merit of the incumbent's past record." ° As is evidenced by its
subsequent affirmance of a license renewal for a radio station that did
virtually nothing more than duplicate the programming of its co-owned
AM station in the same market,"' the D.C. Circuit ultimately insisted
on the form of a full hearing under Citizens Communications Center
without requiring truly "superior" service as the substantive standard for
renewal expectancy."' While "automatic license renewal clearly is improper,' 12 the FCC need not justify each finding of renewal expectancy
by showing that it advances the three-fold rationale for permitting such
expectancies."' Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has accepted the FCC's
policy of weighing structural factors such as diversification and integration less than renewal expectancies." 4 Despite the court's continuing
recitation of its concern that the FCC "not revert to an irrebuttable
presumption in favor of the incumbent,""' it has not overruled the
FCC's renewal approach.""
U.S. at 805 (1978) (citations omitted). See Brinkmann, supra note 79, at 87 (stating that "the
D.C. Circuit amended its opinion to drop language conclusively holding that the Citf.ens superior service standard was the prerequisite of a renewal expectancy"); Comparathe License, supra
note 72, at 1808 n.51.
105. Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
106. fA at 506-07. In the 1978 decision, the court did not define "meritorious" service, but
its decision could be read to imply that such service should be "above average" or at least not
"substandard." See Brinkmann, upra note 79, at 88-89.
107. Central Fla. Enters., 683 F.2d at 506.
108. Ia at 506.07 n.16.
109. Id. at 506.
110. Victor Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 722 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
111. ft The court in Victor Broadcasting accepted the FCC's finding of "superior" service by
the incumbent, suggesting that such service is the basic requirement for reneal expectancy. Id.
at 762. However, as the dissent pointed out, the FCC did not assess the station's non-duplicated programming and the agency's own policies characterize program duplication as inefficient.
f1 at 768, 772, 774-75 (Wilkey, J.,dissenting).
112. I at 761.
113. Id at 765.
114. Id. at 765. The Supreme Court as well has acquiesced in the FCC's practice of giving
renewal expectancy even for substantial or average service. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm.for Broad, 436 U.S. 775, 782-83 & n.5 (1978); Comparative License, supra note 72, at 1809.
115. Victor Broad, 722 F.2d at 765.
116. See Chen, supra note 17, at 1441 (accusing the D.C. Circuit of eventually acceding to
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The FCC'sAmbivalence RegardingProgram Content:

Licensing policy is the perfect screen against which to see the

FCC's ambivalence about its role regarding broadcast content. The
traditional comparative factors-at the initial licensing level-are structural factors designed to lead indirectly to the proper mix of program-

ming and diversity of ideas without direct content intervention. By
contrast, the issue of programming is directly content-based. Although it
did not impose specific programming requirements, the Federal Radio
Commission early on took the position that each licensee should offer
"a well-rounded program schedule, in which entertainment, religion,
education and instruction, important public events, discussions of public
questions, weather, market reports, news and matters of interest to all
members of the family find a place.""' 7 On at least two noteworthy

occasions, the Commission denied license renewals on grounds squarely
based on its disapproval of programming content."' The FCC's "Blue
Book" continued an assumption that regulation would be concerned

with programming, establishing the norms for public service responsibility of broadcast licenses." 9 In its subsequent Report and Statement of
Policy, 20 the Commission described fourteen categories of programming
"usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs and desires of the

community" and representing a "well balanced programming structure..'' The Commission's quantitative processing guidelines were also

the FCC's pro-incumbent presumption).
117. F. KAHN, DocuMENTs OF AmEICAN BROADCASTING 150-51 (3d ed., 1978).
118. Trinity Methodist Church v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 53 S.Ct. 317 (1933) (denying renewal to Reverend Shuler for his vituperative sermons
and sensational attacks against public officials); KFKB Broad. Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n,
47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (rejecting renewal application of Dr. Brinkley, whose "Medical
Question Box" program dispensed medical advice). Admittedly, at least in KFKB, the FCC
relied on the notion that Dr. Brinkley's programming evidenced his use of the station for private, personal purposes rather than for the public interest. Moreover, his programming might
have been thought to be misleading and redolent of consumer fraud. Nevertheless, in both cases, content rather than structure was the underlying ground of non-renewal. See also Simons,
supra note 7, at 863. Cf Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 FCC 333 (1940) (renewing license but
criticizing station for editorializing).
119. Federal Communications Commission, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 11-12 (1946) (establishing affirmative duty to consider program service in FCC public
interest determinations). See also THOMAs G. KRATrENMAKER & LUCAS A. PowE, JR., REGULATING
BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 75 (1994).
120. Report and Statement of Policy, Re: Comm'n en banc Programming Inquiry, 44 FCC
2303 (1960), affd sub nom. Suburban Broadcasters v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 US 821 (1962).
121. Id at 2314.
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triggered by percentages of programming.22

Even under this regime, however, broadcasters had significant discretion as to what could be aired. The FCC did not dictate specific

programming or viewpoints. In addition, the Commission began to
focus on responsiveness to the community as a key element of
licensees' public interest obligations after 1960, and increasingly dis-

tanced itself from criteria directly addressing programming. Having
asserted that "[t]he principal ingredient" of the licensee's public interest
obligation was the effort "to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs and
desires of his service area,"'" the FCC subsequently adopted a detailed

policy for ascertaining community needs rather than continuing to rely
on FCC-defined categories of public interest programming.

4

While retaining the public interest obligation for all broadcast licensees, the FCC in the Deregulation of Radiol'5 and Television Deregulation2 6 decisions significantly deregulated non-entertainment program-

ming obligations. Rejecting the traditional listing of types of programming "usually necessary to meet the public interest,""2 7 the Commission
defined the licensee's programming obligation simply as the provision
of issue-responsive programming to its community." This procedural
approach to performance requires broadcasters simply to maintain quar-

terly issues/programs reports reflecting their most issue-responsive programming for their communities.

9

Currently, besides enforcing the new

122. KRATLTEmAKE & POWE, supra note 119, at 78-79.
123. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission en bane Programming Inquiry, 44 FCC
2303, 2312 (1960).
124. Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 FCC 2d
650 (1971).
125. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 44.
126. Television Deregulation, supra note 44.
127. Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission en bane Programming Inquiry, 44 FCC
2303, 2314 (1960).
128. Deregulation of Radio, supra note 44, at 977-82; Deregulation of Radio, Reconsideration
Order, 87 FCC 2d 797, 804 (1981); Television Deregulation, supra note 44, 98 FCC 2d 1076,
1091 (1984). The deregulatory initiatives eliminated the FCC's formal process for ascertainment
of community needs. Instead, the Commission requires renewal applicants to use any reasonable
means to determine the issues facing their communities.
129. Along with the elimination of specific guidelines for the community ascertainment process, the radio and television deregulation decisions eliminated the requirement that commercial
broadcast stations maintain program logs. Instead, the stations must place in their public inspection files quarterly reports listing programs that have provided the stations' most significant
treatment of community issues during the preceding quarter. Deregulation of Radio, 104 FCC
2d 505, 506-07 (1986); Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements of Commercial Television Stations (Reconsideration), 104 FCC 2d 357 (1986); 73 C.F.R. § 3526(8)(i), (9) (1996).
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children's educational television requirements, the Commission does not
regulate programming categories or specific requirements regarding the
amounts of news, public affairs and non-entertainment programming to
be aired.'
Its turn to a vision of programming review focusing on consumer

rather than FCC concerns may reflect the Commission's increasing
sensitivity to the conflict between public interest license renewal and
free speech interests. 13 ' To the extent that the public interest standard
would require the agency to select the best applicant by comparing
specifics of hourly programming, such a review would be overly intru-

sive. Thus, even the FCC's "categorical" attempt to call for balanced
programming-by elevating certain categories (such as news and public
affairs)-could be seen as an attempt to make the selection process
more objective and predictable.' 32 But applicants could easily enough
structure their files to satisfy the FCC's articulated content standards.'
The ascertainment model would call for even less FCC intrusion into
the definition of the public interest.

After the early years, the Commission did not base non-renewal of
licenses solely on programming. 134 The most common ground for non-

130. See Formulation of Policies and Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Competing Applicants, and Other Participants to the Comparative Renewal Process and to the Prevention of Abuses of the Renewal Process, 5 FCC Red 3092 (1990). The FCC adopted its new
children's educational television rules on August 8, 1996. Broadcast Services; Children's Television, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,981 (1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.RI pt. 73) They include a threehour per-week processing guideline which will permit staff-level renewal approval.
131. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5181;
Gehring, supra note 7, at 577; Donald Gruenwald, Should the Comparative Hearing Process Be
Retained in Television Licensing?, 13 AM. U. L. REV. 164, 183 (1964); Weinberg, supra, note
47, at 1101. See KRATrENMAKER
& PowE, supra note 116, at 78-79 (noting the strategic effect
of "promise versus performance" renewal standards).
132. Weinberg, supra note 47, at 1123.
133. See, e.g., KRATrENmAKER & PoWvv,supra note 116, at 78-79. Cf Jaffe, supra note 7, at
1695, 1697 (remarking on applicant tailoring of proposed programming prior to the 1965 Policy
Statement); Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that with any recipelike selection system, "applicants would immediately start to adopt the specified ingredients
solely to satisfy the Commission, and would feign them . . ."); Central Fla. Enters., 86 FCC
2d 933, 1016 (1981) (arguing that integration and diversification factors should be less central
in renewal cases because "[c]hallengers could easily structure their proposals to be superior to
the incumbent's . . ."); Jonathan Blake, FCC Licensing: From Comparative Hearings to Auctions, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 179, 180 (1994).
134. BARRY OLE & MAL C flNM Ru-crANr ReTalA1: T FCC AD TE BOAX
wA=
134 (1978) (noting that answers to programming questions on renewal questionnaires have never
by themselves resulted in denials of renewal); FRAmNKIN & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 651-54;
. See also United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966) and United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing FCC's renewal of license for
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renewal was misrepresentation to the FCC and other non-speech-related
considerations.' 35 Even when the agency adopted a more procedural
approach to public interest review and compared programming promises
and performance, licenses were never assigned to others solely because
the incumbent failed to live up to its prior programming promises. 3 6
While the agency purported to weigh the merit of the incumbent's past
programming in order to assess the appropriate degree of renewal expectancy to be granted, in fact it did not compare the substantive programming evidence in order to select the "better" programming proposal pursuant to administrative criteria of good non-entertainment programming.
Consistent with its increasing disengagement from broadcast content
review, the FCC expressed its doubts about the comparative renewal
process. The 1970 policy statement implicitly cast doubt on the traditional comparative process. In 1976, the FCC explicitly recommended
to Congress that it eliminate comparative renewal hearings.' It did so

WLBT despite clearly racist programming services); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v.
FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert dented, 394 US. 930 (1969) (affirming FCC's

renewal without hearing of station airing blatantly anti-Semitic programming).
135. FRANKLIN & ANDERSON, supra note 68, at 650-51; Weiss ct al., supra note 69, 76-77 (also
noting that "[plrogramming related offenses. . . were usually part of a longer litany of charges
against the licensee.") See generally Brian C. Murchison, Misrepresentation and the FCC, 37
FED. COMM. LJ.403 (1985) (collecting renewal cases involving misrepresentation and criticizing
FCC's approach).
136. COLE & OEriNGER, supra note 134, at 134; KRATTEMA3
& POWE, supra note 119, at
78-79. Even in uncontested renewal applications, the FCC's approach became increasingly less
content-invasive. At first, the Commission applied an unquantiled, general public interest standard. Then, it adopted quantitative, albeit informal, "processing guidelines" pursuant to which
renewals would only be flagged for full Commission review if they did not meet certain
amounts of specified categories of programming. See Weinberg, supra note 48, at 1123-24,
1187; COLE & OErTINGEtt, supra, note 134, at 137-43. POWE, supra, note 68. Then, it moved to
a reg'mne in which programming information did not have to be submitted for uncontested
filings and renewals would be virtually content-free and automatic. Weinberg, upra note 48, at
1124; Television Deregulation, supra note 44; Deregulation of Radio, supra note 44; Revision
of Applications for Renewal of License of Commercial and Noncommercial AM, FM and Television Licensees, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d 740 (1981), affd sub nom. Black Citizens for a Fair Media
v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Admittedly, however, the objectionable character of
the licensee's broadcasts was one factor in a series of non-renewals in the 1960s and 1970s.
Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL SPORTS & ENT. LJ. 221, 250 (1996).
137. Report of the FCC to the Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House of Representatives Re: The Comparative Renewa
Process (1976), cited in Central Fla Enters., 598 F.2d at nn. 4, 62; 1977 Report, supra note
95, at 429. See also COLE & OEI'NGER, supra note 134, at 142; Brinkmann, supra note 79, at
100. The FCC again voted in 1981 to recommend to Congress that section 309 be amended to
provide for a two-tiered approach to renewals. Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast
Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process (Notice of lnquiry), 88

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:243

on the ground that the process intrudes excessively into broadcaster

discretion without spurring broadcasters to provide the best possible
public service performance. 3 When Congress did not pass such reform
legislation, the FCC commenced a rulemaking proceeding addressing
reform of the renewal process,' 39 "mak[ing] plain that the Commission
would prefer to0 leave all programming considerations completely to the
14
marketplace."'
The D.C. Circuit as well has been sensitive to the problems associ-

ated with FCC review of content in broadcast licensing. In the renewal
context, the court has rejected "functional" approaches to the analysis
of comparative factors because they implicate First Amendment con-

cerns.' 4 The court has also recently voiced some fundamental doubts
about the FCC's role in comparative selection between mutually exclu-

sive applicants for new licenses:
Common sense, not to mention the First Amendment, counsel
against the Commission's trying to decide what America should
see and hear over the airwaves. Further, the ability to pick
persons and firms who will be "successful" at delivering any

kind of service is a rare one, however success might be de-

FCC 2d 120, 121 n.1 (1981).
138. It should be noted, however, that one of the Commission's rationales for its view was
that the existing criteria for evaluating license performance were adequate to assure adherence
to the public interest standard. Those criteria were part of the renewal processing rules (subsequently eliminated in the radio and TV deregulation dockets).
139. Notice of Inquiry, In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 88 FCC 2d 120 (1981); Formulation
of Policies and Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Third Further Notice of Inquiry & Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 FCC Red 6363 (1989). Of course, the Act mandated
termination of the Commission's proceeding considering reform of the comparative renewal process. Implementation of Sections 204(a) and 204(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(Broadcast License Renewal Procedures), 61 Fed. Reg 18,289, 18,290 (1996) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pts 1 and 73).
140. Notice of Inquiry, In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 88 FCC 2d 120, 131 (1981) (statement of Comm'r Fogarty concurring in the result).
141. See Central Fla. Enters., Inc. v FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting FCC attempts
to evaluate whether renewal in a given case would not only formally satisfy structural comparative criteria, but also actually advance the underlying goals of those criteria); Black Citizens for
a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984) (upholding FCC's elimination of programming questions in its uncontested renewal questionnaires
so long as the agency had enough information to determine broadcaster compliance with FCC
policies, despite dissent's claim that statute requires individualized programming reviews for
each licensee at renewal).
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fined; that is why it commands generous rewards in the market.

142

B. Assessments of the Change
The history of comparative renewal demonstrates that, as a result of
the extreme weight accorded to renewal expectancy, the notion of a
full-fledged comparison between incumbent and challenger has historically been honored in the breach. Therefore, apart from the possibility
that the competitive renewal process may, by its existence, have a deterrent effect on the incumbent, it is likely that Dean Krattenmaker is
descriptively correct that the change in renewal process in section 204
of the 1996 Act will not itself lead to any results significantly different
from those under the previous renewal regime.
Nevertheless, the legislative change suggests a change in ideology
(or, at least, in rhetoric and symbol) and poses a normative question.
As noted above, the FCC and the courts, in considering standards for
license renewal, have been ambivalent about the balance between stability and competition. Despite a history of de facto automatic renewals,
the licensing rhetoric has always been comparative. Selection of the
best candidate has consistently been expressed as the public interest
goal. To the extent that a critic might fault the FCC's comparative
renewal process for the predictability of its results, she might blame the
enforcement method rather than the notion of comparative renewal per
se. Instead of taking that route (or even sticking with the traditional
ambivalence and balancing), the new regime-with its elimination of
comparative renewals and its preference for short-term renewal altematives--opts entirely in favor of the stability norm. This raises the question of whether the elimination of comparative renewal is good or bad
in principle.
In theory, comparative renewal could assure the best practicable
service to the public in programming and enhance the independent goal
of diversification. In principle, the renewal decision could rest not only
on programming issues, but also on structural characteristics such as the
effect of non-renewal on diversification in ownership of the mass media. Without such a process, advocates have claimed, the broadcast
industry would be unrepresentative and increasingly lacking diversity.'43

142. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
143. See supra notes 2, 3 (regarding minority groups' views of the comparative process). See
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As the Citizens Communications Center court noted, the comparative
renewal hearing could theoretically serve to increase minority representation and ethnic sensitivity. Advocates of the comparative process

would argue that without it, 144no serious mechanism of public accountability would be in place.
Even if broadcast licensees were virtually never displaced simply as

a result of renewal challenges, without broadcaster misconduct, the
possibility of such challenges could serve to discipline broadcasters in
two ways. First, the possibility of challenges at renewal time may have
a deterrent effect, generally constraining extreme licensee behavior.
Second, the possibility of comparative challenges and petitions to deny

might serve as bargaining chips to extract
programming and other con4

cessions from powerful incumbents.1 1
Advocates of the pre-1996 Act status quo could also question
whether these license-renewal and term-extension rules, when combined
with the other aspects of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, will
reduce diversity. 46 For example, although the 1996 Act does not entirealso Gehring, supra note 7, at 597 (noting proponents' view that comparative renewal encourages licensees to strive to render the best possible service and provides a mechanism whereby
excluded social groups such as racial minorities can gain access to the airwaves).
144. In assessing its abuse of process rules, the FCC stated that its reforms had been successfll in the comparative renewal context in reducing the number of competing applications, suggesting that "settlement limitations are working to weed out non bona fide applicants in the
comparative renewal context .

. . ."

Amendment of Section 73.3525 of the Commission's Rules

Regarding Settlements Among Applicants for Construction Permits, 5 FCC Rcd 3921, 3922
(1990). This suggests that even if a significant percentage of comparative renewal challenges
were strategic in the past, the rule changes led to a pared-down process of bona fide competition. It is these bona fide competitors that the 1996 Act rule eliminates if the incumbent's
operation passes muster. Advocates of the comparative process could argue that this change is
particularly harmful because, although strategic comparative challenges filed only to extract settlement payments would not advance the advocates' substantive goals, bona fide competitors
could mount precisely the kinds of challenges that would enhance broadcast diversity.
145. Minority groups have succeeded in the past in negotiating for diversity-related employment and program-improvement promises from incumbent broadcasters in return for pledges not
to contest renewal applications. See, e.g., Media Reform Through Comparative License - Renewal Procedures - The Citizens' Case, supra note 5, at 930, 934; COLE & OETITNGR, supra note
134, at 228-29. Admittedly, this indirectly constraining effect is probably more relevant to petitions to deny by public interest groups than to comparative challenges by competing applicants
because public interest groups interested in program promises are not likely to seek to operate
the incumbent's station. Although the new Act does not eliminate petitions to deny, its
structural preference for short-term renewals over flat denials also reduces the possibility of
such strategic uses of petition withdrawals.
146. "Diversity" has always been a multi-layered notion in broadcasting. In its 1965 Policy
Statement, for example, the FCC stated that promotion of diversification of control was one of
its two central regulatory goals (the other being "best practicable service to the public"). Policy
Statement on Comparative Broad. Hearings, 1 FCC 2d 393, 394 (1965). [hereinafter 1965 Poll-
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ly eliminate the structural regulations with regard to broadcast ownership, it makes significant changes in the anti-concentration rules. 4 " A
number of mega-mergers already have taken place in the telecommuni-

cy Statement]. The Commission saw value in diversity both as "a public good in a free society" and because it is desirable "where a government licensing system limits access by the
public to the use of radio and television facilities." Id Increasing competition and diversity is
said by the FCC to lead to two positive results: broadened access to the broadcast medium and
the probability of a diversity of views on the air. By the 1950s, the FCC had developed the
ownership issue into "a positive policy of assuring maximum diversity of ideas through the diffusion of media ownership." Hyde, supra, note 7, at 262. This criterion was deemed inherently desirable. Id at 263. Broadened access to the mass media was in turn seen as a particular
potential benefit to minority groups previously excluded from station ownership. See Gehring,
supra note 7, at 597. In 1969 and 1970, advocates of comparative renewal argued against its
elimination on the basis of concerns about both ownership and content diversity. See supra
notes 1-3.
Some have disputed the FCC's position that diversity in programming follows
deconcentration. For a recent argument that only concentrated broadcasters can market high
quality programming in a competitive leisure market, see Chen, supra note 17, at 1445, 144849, 1486-89 (relying on broadcast economists' claims that monopoly in a locality could enhance
diverse programming). But cf KmTrA4MAKER & POWE, supra note 119, at 42-43 (suggesting that
even if monopolists offer more choices in some ranges, diversity of programs is to be expected

once firms become numerous). It is beyond the scope of this Comment to analyze the strong
claim connecting monopoly and diversity and to distinguish the embedded concepts of high
quality programming, format diversity, and viewpoint diversity. Suffice it to say that advocates
of comparative licensing who rely on the process' potential to enhance diversity argue that
there are separate benefits to be gained from both ownership and content/viewpoint diversity.
They also suggest a specific correlation between minority ownership and an increase in
programming aimed at minority audiences. See id at 100. See also Comparative License, jupra
note 72, at 1812 (arguing that excessive emphasis on renewal expectancy "interferes with the
policy favoring an increased number of voices in the broadcast industry, a policy which is
served by taking into account... diversification and minority participation."(footnote omitted)).
Id
147. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202, 110 Stat. at 110.11. As marked by Dean
Krattenmaker, the Act eliminates the restrictions on the number of radio and television stations
that can be owned nationally by one entity (although it does retain a national audience cap for
television). § 202(a), (c), 110 Stat. at 110-11; K.RATE.NtE, supra note 18, at 168-69. Local
restrictions are still in place, however. For example, restrictions on the number of radio stations
that a party can own in one market are retained, with the specific upper limit of ownership to
be determined depending on the size of the market. Telecommunications Act of 1996 §
202(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 110. Prohibitions on television "duopoly"-ownership by one entity of
more than one television station in a market-are also retained, although the Act requires the

FCC to determine whether to retain or modify the rule. Telecommunications Act of 1996 §
202(c), 110 Stat. at 111.
Commentators note that the remaining restrictions on multiple ownership at the local level
are "largely a concession to the Clinton adminisration" because of its concern that complete
elimination of the rules would result in undue media concentration and reduced diversity and
localism. Fordham Symposium, supra note 16, at 520-21 (comments of Antoinette Cook Bush).
Changes in administration priority could lead to changes in these rules. This is particularly
possible because the statute requires a biennial review by the FCC. Telecommunications Act of
1996 § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12.
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cations world.148 Under these circumstances, and in light of the Act's

antitrust-geared anti-concentration approach (rather than the more expansive commitment to diversity under the prior Communications Act re-

gime), those who would wish to maximize diversity for its own sake
and to promote minority voices might wish for a stringent comparative
9
4
renewal process in lieu of the total abdication in the new Act.1
Yet, comparative hearings for renewals have been subject to searing
criticism for numerous failings. The comparative renewal process under

the 1934 Act has been consistently criticized for, among other things,
expense, subjectivity and inconsistency."' It has been particularly chal-

lenged because of the active market in station licenses.'

It has been

148. The most recent of the agglomerations has been the announced purchase of the Infinity
radio stations by the newly combined Westinghouse-CBS entity. Steve McClellan, The Remaking
of CBS, BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 15, 1996, at 4-5. But see Westinghouse/lInfinity Merger Opposed, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 2, 1996, at 20 (noting Spectrum Detroit's petition to deny).
See also Fordham Symposium, supra note 16, at 523-24 (comments of Antoinette Cook Bush,
forecasting "continued consolidation and vertical integration in the broadcast industry"); Chen,
supra note 17, at 1420, 1458, 1489-91 (noting concentration and consolidation in mass
communications and mergers involving the networks).
149. Admittedly, mergers do not decrease minority ownership if they merely consolidate nonminority owned enterprises. But neither do they increase the diversity that the FCC has In the
past touted both for its own sake and for its contribution to a robust marketplace of ideas. In
addition, even mergers that do not affect minority ownership may decrease the diversity of content, ideas, and viewpoints. Rejecting projections that the market will dictate an appropriate
level of diversity of ideas regardless of firm structure and ownership, advocates of the comparative renewal process would surely take the reduction in the FCC's structural regulations as
suggesting that the renewal process should carry the weight of enhancing diversity of all sorts.
150. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 6, at 39-50; Michael Botein, Comparative Broadcast Licensing Procedures and the Rule of Law: A Fuller Investigation, 6 GA. L. REV. 743, 752-54
(1972); Geller, supra note 7, at 501-03, 511-13; Jaffe, supra note 7, at 1695, 1700; Wentz,
supra note 7, at 397-98. Cf Henry Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need
for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (1962) (on failings of comparative criteria in initial licensing contexts). See also Tollin & Kirk, supra note 7, at n.3 (on
cost of renewal challenges); Spitzer, supra note 26, at 999; Citizens Communications Ctr., 447
F.2d at 1205 n.7 (on expense of application in top markets); Monroe Communications Corp. v
FCC, 900 F.2d 351, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J., concurring) (calling all renewal factors "in a sense fictitious").
151. The reason is that, after the initial license has been assigned, there are few realistic
limitations on the further transfer by the licensee of that station. Under § 310(d) of the Communications Act of 1934, license transfers do not require a full-fledged hearing in which other
applicants can be reviewed comparatively with the proposed transferee. See 47 U.S.C. §301(d).
Instead, the FCC is permitted to engage in a review of whether or not the proposed transfer
would be inconsistent with the public interest. In practice, that review is not searching. Even
in the recent past, the FCC has approved transfer applications despite charges that the proposed
transferee would be an inappropriate license holder. See, e.g., Steven A. Lerman, Esq., 74 Rad.
Reg. 2d 743, 9 FCC Rcd 7112 (1994) (permitting assignment of radio station to Infinity
Broadcasting Corp. despite objections that assignee was unfit due to violations of indecency
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condemned for failing even on its own terms because of the overwhelming role of the renewal expectancy.5 2 It has also been charged
with being inherently and definitionally unworkable.'
With regard to the claimed disciplining effects of the comparative
renewal process, indirect bargaining for the public interest may not be
the best and most efficient option from a policy-making prospective. It
may well be that, as a society, we would be better off if the FCC were
to impose and truly enforce strict equal-employment-opportunity requirements rather than permit the piecemeal elaboration of policy initiatives through comparative renewal challenges and strategic deployment
of petitions to deny. At a minimum, such processes raise the question

of which public interest groups have been involved in negotiations with
broadcasters." 5 Moreover, the Commission has been implementing various rules in its "abuse of process" dockets that make it harder to use
the renewal process strategically. 5 ' In addition, the deterrent value of

the comparative hearing is not easily quantified. While the potential
expense of the hearing process must have had some constraining effect
on broadcasters over the years, a history of renewals of even egregiously bad stations must have reassured broadcasters that a broad range of

performance would be deemed to warrant the virtually determinative
effect of renewal expectancy. 56
When comparative renewal is nothing more than an expensive for-

rules by the Howard Stem Show broadcasts on its other situations).
In addition, the FCC eliminated its three year anti-trafficking rule in 1982. Amendment of
the Commission's Rules Regarding Applicants for Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,924 28 (1982), cited in Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 880 (D.C. Cir
1993). (From 1962 to 1982, the FCC's policies had discouraged assignments of stations held
for less than three years. Procedures on Transfer and Assignment Applications, 32 FCC 689,
691 (1962), cited in Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 880.) The agency declined to reinstate the rule in
1989. Amendment of section 733597, 4 FCC Red 1710, 1710 4 (1989), cited In Bechtel 10
F3d at 880. It did, however, adopt a one-year holding period for stations won in comparative
hearings. See Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 879-80. Thus, the notion of imposing the extreme cost of
comparative licensing renewal hearings on all parties seems, to critics, to be inconsistent with
the rest of the fluid market in broadcast properties.
152. Citizens Communications Ctr., 447 F.2d at 1204.
153. See, e.g., 1977 Report, supra note 95, at 429; Anthony, upra note 6, at 111-12;
Brinkmann, supra note 79, at 93; Gehring, supra note 7, at 574, 589. Cf Wentz, upra note 7,
at 391.

154. See COLE & OErTTGER, supra note 134, at 229-32.
155. See supra notes 43, 144.
156. See Victor Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 722 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming renewal of
station duplicating programming of other co-oined station in market); PoWE, supra note 69, at
90-92 (describing the extraordinary WLBT story); Geller, supra note 3, at 489-96 (describing
Moline and KHJ-.TV)
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mal exercise to confirm an incumbent, it is entirely wasteful and inefficient. Even when it is undertaken seriously and in good faith, its
value depends on the assumption that the FCC can determine the better
applicant-and, indeed, that there is the possibility of an incontestable
consensus on what would be better service and who would provide it.
Criticisms of the comparative renewal process do not have to rest on
the allegation that the FCC was disingenuous in its application of renewal standards. In the end, it may be that the FCC cannot meaningfully choose between applicants and identify the "best" applicant in a
comparative renewal hearing. The comparative hearing only gives the
Commission the choice of competing applicants. At most, even in theory, it could only pick the "better" candidate. Moreover, it may be that
the Commission is particularly unable to pick the best applicant if it
cannot make direct content distinctions. After all, it is likely that all
applicants are reasonably qualified or can make their applications so
appear.'57 Even if it could properly make content comparisons, on what
basis could the FCC legitimately select among programs? Such comparative analysis cannot be done without a normative basis. Selecting
one party over another is not a value-neutral choice. Both the criteria
selected for comparison and the application of the selection criteria are
fully normative. For example, even if the FCC could uncontroversially
select the better applicant from the programming vantage point, it
would often have to choose between the applicant with good programming and the applicant with other desirable characteristics. That broadcast regulation historically has had multiple (and sometimes conflicting)
goals will necessarily be reflected in the renewal process.
At some level, the ideal-type of the comparative hearing process
places a lot of content-related responsibility in the FCC's hands.' One

157. See Central Fla. Enters., 598 F.2d at 59 n.7 (quoting Judge Leventhal's dissent in Star
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1089, 1094-95, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969) In

which he expressed doubt about the FCC's ability to distinguish on principle among all the
reasonably qualified candidates in comparative hearings).

158. The best arguments against the comparative hearing are that it potentially involves the

FCC in excessive content review of broadcasters' editorial discretion and does not provide suffi-

cient benefits to outweigh its costs. I thank Dean Krattenmaker for his suggestion that opponents of the comparative hearing might focus on the many other ways to improve programming-for example, by expanding outlets and covering costs.

This approach would lack the

disadvantage associated with comparative hearings requiring impossible comparisons between the
value of encouraging investments and the value of competing promises as to programming. By
contrast, the mere recitation of the fact that hearings are lengthy and expensive does not necessarily lead to any particular conclusion. There are alternatives to throwing out the baby with
the bath water. For example, one might require limitations of time for the hearings, or Iiml-

19961

NOT WITH A BANG BUT A WHIMPER

might think it troubling to have the FCC decide which would be the
"best" of the competitors. Given that the selection is not a value-neutral
task, there could be significant constitutional problems with a truly fullfledged comparative process as potentially envisioned in the CCC case.
As is demonstrated by the uncomfortable response of the D.C. Circuit
in circumstances in which the FCC did use a functional, content-oriented approach, a very searching type of content-oriented role for the FCC
is disturbing."5 9
In addition to the First Amendment-based anxiety about searching
content comparisons, there is also the practical uncertainty about comparative hearing criteria in a post-Bechtel world."co In Bechtel v. FCC,
the D.C. Circuit struck down the integration of ownership and management as an arbitrary and capricious standard in comparative hearings
for new license assignments. 6" Moreover, some doubt may be cast on

tations on the permissible amount of data on key issues. The winner of the hearing could be
required to pay large fees except as waived for educational groups or underrepresented groups.
This would create incentives for faster and better hearing processes. Other reforms as well
might be suggested. Thus, the litigation-like character of hearings in the past need not serve as
an impenetrable barrier to process reforms in the future. Even if the hearings were changed
procedurally, however, far more serious problems with the comparative process would remain.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 141-142.
160. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993). See also Lee G. Petro, A New Trialfor
Solomon: Comparative Hearings After Bechtel II, 4 CO.M. L CoxPsEcr.s 221 (1996).
161. Prior to Bechtel, the FCC had a comparative policy of preferring applicants who promised that the station's owners would participate in its management. Although such an "integration" criterion had its roots in early FCC cases, see Bechtel, 10 F.3d at 877, it was most
strongly articulated in the 1965 Policy Statement, I FCC 2d 393 (1965). There, the Commission said that integration of ownership and management was both inherently desirable and more
likely to lead to "the best practicable service." Id at 395. The 1965 Polcy Statement and
subsequent rulings provided that integration credit for a competing applicant could be "enhanced" by such factors as local residence in the proposed service area, civic participation, and
minority status. At at 395-396.
The court in Bechtel held that continued application of the integration preference would be
arbitrary and capricious. 10 F.3d at 887. It did so because the Commission's rules did not
ensure permanent integration, ia at 879-80; because of the lack of evidence regarding the
policy's benefits, id at 880-81; because of the excessive weight of the integration factor, Id. at
881-82; and because the court did not accept the FCC's positive arguments for integration, Id.
at 886. It found that the integration policy did not serve the FCC's stated goal that "stations
perform better when managed by those with the 'most direct financial interest' in the venture."
Id at 882-83. The court found "trivial" the goal that day-to-day management decisions be made
by those with the greatest legal responsibility for the station. Id. at 883-84. It discounted the
FCC's arguments that integrated owners are more likely than absentee owners to have an active
interest in the station's operations, id. at 884, and that on-site owNers have better sources of
information. Id. at 884-85. Finally, with respect to the FCC's claim of greater objectivity for
the integration factor as a structural rather than content-based criterion, the court concluded that
such objectivity is "illusory," with "every step ... packed with subjective judgments, some
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the diversification criterion as the basis for initial licensing decisions
under the 1965 Policy Statement on comparative hearings. The Tele-

communications Act of 1996 makes significant changes in the multiple
ownership rules that affect radio and television. 62 It may well be, then,

that the traditional application of the diversification criterion under the
1965 Policy Statement would no longer be appropriate under the

changed assumptions about competition underlying the 1966 Telecommunications legislation. Furthermore, the FCC still has not closed its

pending proceeding on standards for comparative hearings, leaving the
63

process currently in limbo.

Finally, some would argue that in a world in which so many other
information and entertainment options are available to the public, we
need not worry as much as we otherwise might about the FCC's ability
to select the "best" possible broadcaster. Fans of deregulation might
argue that choice and competition-particularly because over-the-air

broadcasting is only one of an increasing array of information sources
available to the American public-mean that consumers would be able
to express their programming preferences and lave them met.'

generic, some ad hoc." Id. at 885.
162. See supra note 144. See also Margaret L. Tobey & Phuong N. Pham, The Broadcast
Ownership Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 COMM. LAW. 6 (Summer
1996); Fordhan Symposium, supra note 16, at 520-28 (comments of Antoinette Cook Bush describing ownership provisions and industry consolidations); Robert A. Burka, New Radio Limits
Raise Antitrust Concerns, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 29, 1996, at 23.
163. Proposals to Reform the Commission's Comparative Hearing Process, Report and Order,
6 FCC Red 157 (1990); In re Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast
Hearings, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd 2664 (1992); Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 8 FCC Red 5475 (1993); Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings, Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 9 FCC Red 2821 (1994).
For a nice summary of the problems with the 1965 Policy Statement, see Weinberg, supra note
47, at 1116-20. Bechtel led the FCC to freeze both comparative renewal applications and mutually exclusive proposals for new broadcast facilities while it examined its comparative criteria.
FCC Freezes Comparative Proceedings, 9 FCC Rcd 1055 (1994); Modification of FCC Comparative Proceedings Freeze Policy, 9 FCC Red 6689 (1994). The FCC's delay in resolving the
comparative process issue led to the filing of a recent lawsuit seeking to compel adoption of
new criteria for selection among mutually exclusive applicants for new broadcast stations. Harry
A. Jessell, Radio Applicants Take FCC to Court, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept 2, 1996, at 20.
164. See Second Further Notice of Inquiry & Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 43, at 5186;
Chen, supra note 17, at 1505-06 (arguing generally that intermodal competition constrains market power even of large, consolidated entities and that regulation by the FCC is misguided and
harmful). As I rely principally on other harms associated with the traditional comparative renewal scheme, a searching assessment of this claim is unnecessary. However, this rationale for
deregulation is contested by fans of regulation, particularly in a climate of consolidation, because of doubts about the current extent of intermodal competition, and in light of the advertiser-supported character of broadcasting. Moreover, the argument is based on an assumption that
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Given the demise of the integration criterion, the discomfort with
extremely searching comparisons of content or format, the changes in

the diversification and anti-concentration rules under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and the continuing FCC inquiry on comparative

hearing standards, there is a nice question of precisely what a comparative renewal hearing would have looked like if section 204 had not

been passed. Apart from the affirmatively beneficial results posited by
Dean Krattenmaker,165 I think there are good policy reasons to avoid an

invigorated conception of the comparative renewal hearing process.
Ultimately, perhaps Dean Krattenmaker is right to focus not on the
ideal type of a comparative hearing, but rather on the traditional pro-

cess itself. Perhaps the real answer to the question of diversity of ideas
and ownership is that comparative renewal hearings did not in practice
support that goal in the past, and that, therefore, we should simply and
directly achieve diversity inter alia through well-crafted minority-owner-

ship policies enforced by the FCC." In statutorily recognizing that
comparative renewal hearings did not work, Congress opted not to
reaffirm the traditional rhetoric of the comparative mechanism of selec-

the satisfaction of indirectly expressed consumer prefcrences, rather than a vision of superior
programming, is the appropriate goal of public policy. After all, it may be that consumers want
"merely average" service. Then the market will not promote superior service instead of mediocre programming. This deregulatory justification thus begins from a vantage point far removed
from the traditional aspiration that comparative criteria be used to discern those applicants capable of providing "superior" service.
165. Ultimately, Dean Krattenmaker makes an empirical claim in his piece (although not
strongly) that administrative and regulatory costs could be avoided by broadcasters as a result
of the changes in the broadcast licensing rules. Dean Krattenmaker does not specifically identify
the cost savings he posits. One might presume that the savings would concern comparative
hearing and legal fees. While that cost could potentially be quite high, it is questionable whether the new rule in fact necessarily diminishes such fees. Might it not in fact cost significant
sums to show that an incumbent has been following the rules? Moreover, to the extent that
there has been a strong renewal expectancy in the historical record, I am not sure about the
accuracy of Dean Krattenmaker's claim that the rule change is likely to have a positive efftct
on programming and talent contract terms. As renewal has been par for the course, in practice,
one would expect that concerns about non-renewal would not have significantly affected contract
negotiations involving the typical broadcast station under the old regime. Therefore, one might
wonder with Dean Krattenmaker about the significance to contract negotiations of the formal
elimination of comparative renewal.
166. Admittedly, the question of diversity in ownership is perceived as requiring careful FCC
study in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995). The FCC is currently engaged in a review of its minority-oriented policies in
light of that decision. Chairman Hundt has publicly reaffirmed his commitment to "continuing
the cause of including minorities and women in the communications revolution." Federal News
Service Washington Package Transcript, National Press Club Luncheon Speaker Reed Hundt,
July 27, 1995.
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tion. Yet, in changing the renewal procedure, it did not eliminate FCC
discretion and the possibility of more direct FCC impact on broadcaster
conduct via the renewal mechanism.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE RENEWAL STANDARDS AND THE BASIS FOR A NEW "DEAL"' 67

Although it eliminated the comparative hearing and the conceit that
the FCC could select the best broadcaster from such a comparison,
Congress did not in fact go very far in the new Act's license renewal
provisions. It did not take the opportunity completely to eliminate the
notion of the public interest from the licensing process. Instead, it provided a non-comparative renewal standard leached of explicit content
and capable of serving as an invitation to radically different kinds of
governmental
intervention. By contrast to this view, Dean
Krattenmaker's article could be read not only to propose that section
204 makes a modest change, but also to assume a relatively narrow,
compliance-based interpretation of the 1996 Act's renewal requirements."6 8 In fact, I think that substantively this new statute is quite
open-ended.
Strikingly, by contrast to the extent to which the legislation micromanages standards-for example, with regard to local ownership restrictions-the new Act does not define the renewal standards to be used in
connection with section 204. In its April 12, 1996 Order implementing
the broadcast license renewal provision of the Act, the FCC adopted a
two-step renewal procedure pursuant to which comparative renewals are
eliminated with respect to renewal applications filed after May 1, 1995.
The Order, which restated the statutorily described process, explicitly
declined to provide definitions of the renewal standards to be used. It
stated simply that: "[ilt is our present intent to continue to apply existing policy statements and case law, refining these as appropriate on a
case-by-case basis, in interpreting the statutory terms that govern the
new renewal process."'1 69 This leaves the future very open and reinforc-

167. Hundt & Kornbluh, supra note 30.
168. See also PETER W. HUBER Er AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS AcT OF 1996 69 (1996)

(concluding that the elimination of comparative hearings "will limit the FCC's ability to deny
renewals on the basis of program content").
169. Order, In re Implementation of Sections 204(a) and 204(c) of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (Broadcast License Renewal Procedures), 61 Fed. Reg. 18,289 (Apr. 25, 1996).

The Commission released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the question of extending

broadcast license terms to eight years as permitted (but not mandated) by §203 of the 1996
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es a significant amount of discretion in the FCC.
The standard for renewal as defined by the 1996 Act has two parts:
the affirmative prong of public interest operation and the compliance
element. 7 ' With regard to the question of operation in the public interest, neither the statute nor the FCC answers the question of how one is
to test such operation.' Ignoring, for the moment, any constitutional
problems, one possibility is to have the FCC engage in a subjective
evaluation of whether the station has operated in the public interest.
Even that subjective evaluation could be either about content, or about
structural issues, or both. Yet another possibility is to eschew a subjective review by the FCC of the desirability of a station's programming
in favor of a procedural approach focusing on issue-responsiveness.
Some have read this into the Commission's statement of intention to
continue to apply existing precedent in the renewal context. They have
concluded that the public interest requirement of the new Act will be
deemed satisfied by licensees' showings of programming responsive to
ascertained community issues."7 If we focus on the Commission's renewal history in 1995, we might conclude that even under the new
legislation, the most likely cause for denial of renewal applications
would be violations of FCC ownership rules, lack of candor before the
Commission, or inadequate compliance with equal employment opportunity requirements.' In keeping with the radio and television deregulation Orders' preference for procedural reviews of content, 74 the issueresponsiveness approach would address the question of public interest
operation at a rather minimal, unintrusive level of review. Particularly
in light of the meager showing required by the quarterly issues-programs lists that broadcasters have filed since the deregulation decisions,
the public interest operation standard could be close to a dead letter
from the point of view of programming if no more stringent review of
issue-responsiveness is to take place by the FCC.
Act. NPRM in Docket No. 96-90, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,864 (Apr. 23, 1996).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
171. As Professor Glen Robinson has put it, "plainly the 'public interest' phase is one of

those atmospheric commands whose content is as rich and variable as the legal imagination can
make it according to the circumstances that present themselves to the policy-maker (under the
supervision of the courts, of course)." Glen 0. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An
Esay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, inA LEGISLAnVE HLSTORY OF m Co'.,,mUIcAnoNs ACT
OF 1934 16 (Max D. Paglin, ed., 1989).
172. See, e.g., Mark D. Schneider, Reneiul Procedures and Expectancy Before and After the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 COMM. LAW. 9, 10 (Summer 1996).
173. Id (listing and characterizing grounds of recent non-renewal cases).
174. See supra notes 125-29.
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The compliance aspects of the standard are similarly undefined.
Each could be narrow or broad. For example, what should count as a
serious violation? How are we to define the notion of violation? Will
we limit it to adjudicated violations? Even with regard to the more
minor infractions, how is the FCC to determine what should count as a
pattern of abuse? Overall, the question remains against what the concept of compliance is to be tested. Moreover, the 1996 Act does not
provide any guidance for or limitations on the kinds of rules and regulations the FCC can adopt in articulating its presumptive understanding
of the public interest or its regulatory role. In other words, while the
renewal or non-renewal of a station's license depends on whether serious violations of such rules have been proven, or upon whether nonserious violations are sufficient in number to amount to a pattern of
abuse, the legislation does not provide any limitations on the substantive regulations as to which those assessments should be made. Therefore, the question of whether the non-renewal provision of the Act
should be considered retrogressive or progressive from a civil
libertarian's point of view would seem to depend largely on whether or
not the FCC rules which are to serve as the benchmark in the renewal
7
process are themselves formal and editorially unintrusive. 1
Dean Krattenmaker has noted in his article that if stations comply
with FCC rules, they probably will be automatically renewed. 76 A
totally deregulatory FCC would lead to automatic renewal for perfectly
average compliance and little if no content review. At best, in keeping
with notions of the public interest in a post-deregulation world, the
only significant question for the FCC would be whether some issueresponsive programming had been aired by a station as described in its
quarterly issues-programs reports. This would not be significantly different from current enforcement standards.
On the other hand, the statute may leave a significant opening for
the FCC to put a particular kind of bite into the renewal process. To
the extent that the agency reads the criterion of operation in the publicinterest as a separate requirement with actual content-and, indeed, as
addressing programming content-it could use the new statute as an
occasion for direct-content regulation as a quid pro quo for the removal
or diminution of structural constraints. Public statements by Reed Hunt,

175. I mean here to refer to traditional free speech/press advocates. It should be noted that
the First Amendment is also invoked in the broadcasting context by those who argue for regu-

latory interventions in behalf of "the public's right to know."
176. See Krattenmaker, supra, note 18 at 134.
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Chairman of the Commission, suggest a particular vision of such direct
content involvement.' 7
Chairman Hundt has dismissed the FCC's traditional rules to safeguard the public interest as "vague to the point of meaninglessness."7 8
While characterizing the current requirement of issue-responsive programming as "a laudable goal," he has despaired that its "meaning in
practice is hopelessly indeterminate.'W7 9 Accordingly, he has identified a
"turning point" in the history of broadcasting and called for a change
in the FCC's requirements of its licensees. 8 ' Asking broadcasters to
"renew the deal" between themselves and the public "in a way that
gives meaning to [their] public interest responsibilities," the Chairman
has signaled a new and different interpretation of the licensee's8 mandate to operate in the public interest, convenience and necessity.' '
Chairman Hundt's approach suggests that the public interest requires
certain limited kinds of programming obligations for broadcasters, to be
targeted for renewal review by the FCC:
This option entails translating the broadcasters' duty to serve
the public interest into a limited number of clear and concrete
requirements-rules that are understandable and enforceable .... If we renew the public's deal with broadcasters,
these few specific public interest requirements would be virtually the only requirements on broadcasters. The FCC would continue to extract itself from the business of meddling in the
strictly commercial aspects of broadcaster's businesses. But we
would have to agree, finally, to real requirements for broadcasters.

182

Chairman Hundt identifies these obligations as based on Congressional
concerns and not self-generated FCC requirements. For example, he
focuses specifically on Congressional guidance in four areas: the need
for children's educational programming under the Children's Television
Act of 1990; the 1934 Act's requirements that radio and television
broadcasters provide equal opportunities and, when relevant, the lowest-

177. Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airs:
What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?, 45 DuKE LJ. 1089 (1996); Hundt & Kombluh, supra note 30.
178. Hundt & Kombluh, supra note 30, at 12.
179. Id at 13.
180. Id at 11.
181. Id at 16.
182. Id at 16.
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unit charge for political campaign advertising; the prohibition on inde-

cent broadcasts outside of a safe harbor pursuant to the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992; and the 1996 Act's own requirement that
television manufacturers install "V-chips" to help 8parents
block expo3
sure to sexual or violent or other indecent material.
Having identified the areas of importance to Congress, Chairman
Hundt suggests that the FCC regulate in those areas by adopting objective and verifiable criteria for all of them. 8 4 He is interested in promoting "clear, unambiguous, concrete, and tradable duties."' 8 5 Consistent
with this view, for example, the FCC has recently required that broadcast licensees provide three hours of educational programming per week
to satisfy a renewal-processing guideline. 8 6 A new type of regulatory
mind-set, which might be described as antitrust-based, appears to be behind this approach. In the view of Chairman Hundt, for example, the
market should prove regulatorily adequate to permit the flourishing of

183. See Hundt, supra note 177, at 1089-90. Chairman Hundt has alerted us that:
[it] is time for a sea change in FCC policy and practice regarding the public interest
standard. The Commission should aim to promulgate a few clear rules that set forth
concrete requirements, are testable in court by any broadcaster who objects to their
application, and are enforceable by the FCC in a predictable manner that makes
license renewal proceedings efficient and meaningful. In particular, with regard to
positive requirements, broadcasters should be required to provide a specific amount of
educational programming for children. In addition, we need a new deal providing
candidates with free access to the airwaves. With regard to negative requirements,
broadcasters ought not show indecent or violent programs during the day or evening
hours, when large numbers of children are likely to be in the audience. However,
broadcasters might be permitted to show programming suitable only for adults at
earlier times of night if they rate their shows so that they can be read and screened
out by computer chips in televisions, set-top boxes, or other such devices.
Id. at 1096.
184. See Hundt & Kombluh, supra note 30, at 16:
There are two choices for how we can proceed. As a society, we can renew the
deal between broadcasters and the public in a way that gives meaning to the public
interest responsibilities of broadcasters . . . . If broadcasters reject these terms, then
the public may consider an alternative: giving up on the deal and starting all over.
Broadcasters would have no public interest requirements. They would havc no special
privileges either.
Id.
185. See id.at 19; See also Hundt, supra note 177, at 1094.
186. Report & Order, Broadcast Services; Children's Television, MM Docket 93-48, 61 FR
43981, 1996 FCC LEXIS 4306 (Aug. 8, 1996). The new rules define core children's educational programming and provide that if a station has regularly aired at least three hours per
week of such programming between 7:00am and 10:00pm, it will have the Children's Television Act portion of its license renewal application approved by the Commission staff automatically. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 (1996). See also Lawrie Mifflin, It's Now Law: 3 Hours of
Children's TV!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A16.
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broadcast speech except in a few identified areas of market failure.
There, it would be appropriate to establish objective and concrete content requirements in order to provide market correctives. Accordingly,
this means the FCC should deregulate virtually all commercial
aspects of broadcasting, because they are best left to the market, while we improve our rules in those areas where market
forces will not deliver the services Congress and the public

interest require. Congress has determined that market forces are
unlikely to produce desirable amounts of children's educational
programming and campaign information, and may produce a
"race to the bottom" with respect to indecency and violence."
Depending on how it is in fact enforced, this might be seen as a
contractarian sort of administrative model.' In other words, according
to this model, the FCC would give up the possibility of a direct role in
overall content review. A Commission with Chairman Hundt's agenda

would not be interested in administrative correction of the overall "vast

187. Hundt, supra note 177, at 1091. With respect to children's educational programnning. for
example, Chairman Hundt has argued that because "[a]dvertising dollars follow desirable viewers . . . [and] children constitute a smaller potential audience than adults ...
. (m]arket forces
in this instance work in opposition to the interests of society" Hundt & Kombluh, supra note
30, at 15. Therefore, regulatory requirements that broadcasters air children's educational programming are necessary to adjust the reality that "[a]dvertisers value children less than adults
as a potential market, but society benefits more from educating children than from entertaining
adults." Id. Otherwise, "[ilf
broadcasters are not obligated to provide public interest programming that the market fails to generate.... it will be exceedingly difficult to explain to the
American people why digital spectra worth billions of dollars should be given to broadcasters
and not auctioned to the highest bid'der." Id. at 17.
188. The Chairman's "deal" and "contract" rhetoric is pronounced. In a speech at the National Press Club, for example, he proposed that "broadcasters in each community should develop a
contract for kids and community:"
In each market all broadcasters would state concretely and specifically how they
intend to give parents a choice of high quality, decent, non-violent and educational
programming. And how they would give parents in the community the power to
choose it. In each market broadcasters would tell their audience, at the beginning of
the period of their licenses to use the public airwaves, what exactly they intend to
do for kids and the communities they serve. And then we at the Federal Communications Commission would base the renewal of these licenses on the success or failure that the broadcasters had in performing the way they promised. Market by market the broadcasters contracts for kids and community would give real meaning on a
local level to public interest obligations. No more vagueness, no more confusion. In
each market we would have clear commitments by which to measure whether broadcasters have met their public interest obligations.
Federal News Service Washington Package Transcript, National Press Club Luncheon Speaker
Reed Hundt, July 27, 1995.
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wasteland" of television. 9 This would be an attractive option, given
the constitutionally questionable role of such direct overall content
review.190 Yet the Hundt FCC could develop a new contractarian model
of regulation in which broadcasters enter into social contracts with
regard to identified areas of expected market failure, in return for
which they are otherwise subject to minimal regulation. This means,
then, a regime of structural deregulation, joined with direct but targeted
content regulation. A contractarian Commission would also give up
indirect and quasi-procedural content directives such as the fairness doctrine, all in return for assertedly specific, objective and easily enforceable criteria for certain kinds of programming obligations, both negative
and affirmative. 9'
The model of an interventionist agency with a public mandate to
spur the most powerful mass medium to provide programming in the
public interest-that is to say the FCC of the Kennedy administration-was followed by the FCC of the Reagan administration, with its
wholesale deregulatory bent on both the content and structural fronts.
Newton Minow, President Kennedy's FCC Chairman, publicly challenged broadcasters to do something about the vast wasteland on television.92 Mark Fowler, FCC Chairman under President Reagan, said
television is nothing more than a toaster with pictures.' 93 The Reed
Hundt Commission-enabled by the fact that the Congress did not
define the public interest or eliminate it as a benchmark for licensing in

189. The characterization of the television day as a vast wasteland is probably Chairman
Newton Minow's most-quoted bon mot. NEWTON MINOW, EQUAL TIME 45, 52 (1964); KRASNOW ET
AL., supra note 1, at 47.

190. Chairman Hundt recognizes the pitfalls of overall programming requirements:
If our rules actually require something-and something unknowable-of broadcasters,
they might be rejected as constitutionally intolerable because they might permit abuse.
It is the fact that they actually require nothing of broadcasters that has mitigated the
potential injury to constitutional principles. But this is certainly not sufficient justification for vague standards that give the public nothing in exchange for the valuable
public resource broadcasters are permitted to use.
Hundt & Kornbluh, supra note 30, at 13.
191. The Act itself may be read to lend support to such a policy-based interventionist interpretation. For example, the Act requires all renewal applicants to list complaints they have
received about violent programming aired by the station. Telecommunications Act of 1996
§204(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. 308(d)). This requirement effectively requires the FCC to consider such complaints at renewal. It also prompts organized "public issue groups" to file letters.
Responsive self-censorship by broadcasters is likely. See HUBER Er AL., supra note 168, at 69.
192. See supra note 189.
193. Caroline E. Mayer, FCC Chiefs Fears: Fowler Sees Threat in Regulation, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 1983, at K6. See also Hundt & Kombluh, supra note 30, at 17.
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the 1996 Act-may adopt a middle-of-the-road position between the
Kennedy and Reagan models of FCC licensing. Although Chairman
Hundt has said that notions of democracy and citizenship support his
proposals, 94 he does not endorse broad-based FCC attempts to ensure
democratic discourse on the broadcast medium. 9 ' He simply requires
payment of a discrete toll.
Despite this regulatory sea-change, however, Dean Krattenmaker
may note that the 1996 Act's renewal provisions might not increase the
rate of non-renewals. After all, that non-renewal of a license is a draconian punishment may suggest that renewals would likely remain virtually automatic even in the world of the Hundt FCC. Since the new Act
eliminated comparative renewal hearings, a denial of renewal could
result in the loss of a broadcasting service if no other applicants come
forward after the denial. One might fear that the FCC would still renew
all but the most grossly inadequate applicants in order to avoid a service shut-down.
However, mechanical renewal of barely adequate broadcasters is not
the only-or even the most likely-possibility. First, it is unlikely that
those applicants who would have been challengers had we still had
comparative renewal hearings would decline to participate in the initial
hearing for the station whose incumbent failed the renewal standard. If
they would have been willing to brave the power of the renewal expectancy in the traditional comparative renewal hearing, they would surely
participate in an initial comparative hearing without the expectancy
element weighing so heavily in the balance.
Second, because the public interest obligations contemplated by
Chairman Hundt are characterized as quantitative and "objective"--and
because they eliminate the definitional uncertainty of a comparative
system-future compliance with FCC rules and operation in the public
interest may be thought by the FCC to be much easier and more automatic."' Therefore, because the nature of the regulatory regime is as-

194. See, e.g., Hundt & Kombluh, supra note 30, at 20 (describing the democratic value of
children's educational programming); Hundt, supra note 177, at 1097 (discussing public interest
requirements as advancing First Amendment goals of public deliberation and democratic selfgovemment).
195. Chairman Hundt has publicly opposed the resuscitation of the fairness doctrine, for example. See, e.g., Neil Hickey, Revolution In Cyberla: As the FCC. the Congres and
Megamedia Redraw the Map, Who Will Tell the People, COLtUm. JOU.NASIJSM REV., July/Aug.

1995, at 40, 47.
196. This is not to say that the rules to be promulgated by such an FCC would in fact be
"objective." Rather, it is to suggest that the FCC's belief in the objectivity of these rules might
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serted to make compliance easier, the FCC might be less reluctant to
withhold the non-renewal or short-term renewal sanctions from broadcasters than it would have been under the 1934 Act.
Most importantly, the significance of a shift in the regulatory priorities should not be ignored even if the actual rate of non-renewal does
not increase. The threat of non-renewal may in fact become more
meaningful in the future than it-was under much of the 1934 Act's
history. It might well lead to more effective FCC control of some areas
of broadcast content under the new Act, without being reflected in any
clear enforcement statistics at renewal time.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to evaluate the specific
public interest requirements being crafted by the Hundt FCC. It should
be noted in general, however, that such a possible contractarian vision
of the FCC's role might disturb both progressive critics of the mass
media and broadcast-First Amendment purists. The former might argue
that the FCC passed up the opportunity to constrain the increasing
commercialization, commodification, and political imbalance of radio
and television. They might claim that the Commission abandoned the
overall public interest by permitting itself to be bought off with a few
hours of children's television and promises of a few minutes of free air
time for political advertisements.197
The latter-First Amendment purists such as Dean
Krattenmaker-would object to broadcasting's continuing second class
citizenship vis-A-vis the First Amendment in such a Hundt regime.
These advocates might point to the manipulability of the Hundt standards and challenge the Chairman's claims of objectivity and verifiability in public interest regulation. They might question whether the new
regulations would satisfy their goals any more than did the traditional
comparative renewal process. They might also worry about the potentially homogenizing effect on public discourse of regulatory interventions guided principally by the political causes of the moment. In sum,
they might question both the wisdom and constitutionality of direct
content regulation of broadcasting at this late point in the day.'98

affect its expectations of broadcaster compliance.
197. Cf Becker, supra note 27, at 176-80.

198. Cf Concurring Statement of Comm'r James H. Quello, Report and Order on Children's
Television Programming Rules, 11 FCC Red 10660, 10766 (expressing concern that rationale
for children's television requirement is too broad and could be used to justify other types of
quantitative programming requirements by future Commissions).
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CONCLUSION

I suspect that comparative renewal as historically understood did
not satisfy its intended goals. I agree with Dean Krattennaker's observation that its demise would not make much practical difference, all
else being equal. Therefore, and in light of important First Amendment
interests, the decision to eliminate the possibility of a true point-bypoint comparison as suggested under CCC is probably the better part of
valor from the policy standpoint. That is not to say that I am sanguine
about the desirability of mediocre broadcasting or resigned to a communications landscape with little diversity. Rather, it is only to say that a
truly reinvigorated comparative renewal standard would be problematic,
while the continuation of the FCC's traditional approach would do not
much more than waste money on predictable results.
At the same time, we should not lose sight of the fact that the
open-ended nature of the new statutory standards for renewal provides
the opportunity for some real changes in renewal policy. Given that a
property/auction model has not been adopted by Congress, I would
hope that the 1996 Act's change in renewal process would not be interpreted by the FCC as an invitation to abdicate any licensing oversight
in favor of rubber-stamping renewals without searching review of compliance with the Act and FCC rules. In the same breath, to the extent
that the licensing changes in the 1996 Act provide an opportunity to
see a new model of administrative agency operation and a revived
public interest obligation, I would urge that these changes raise many
questions as to the neutrality, administrability, and fairness of this kind
of technocratic response to conservative or mainstream moral concerns.
Without suggesting that I am not concerned about violence on television, smut on the air, or inadequate children's educational programming, I think that significant thought should be given to what precisely
we can gain from the kinds of quantitative interventions that a
contractarian model of renewal administration might promise. The extent to which such a hybrid model will in fact become a reality under
the current FCC is an important question. An assessment of such a
development is an exercise for another day.

